How the Nations Waged War / A companion volume to "How the War Began"
Date: 2018-01-12T00:00:00+00:00
Keywords: World War; 1914-1918

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Title: How the Nations Waged War

Author: J. M. Kennedy

Release date: January 12, 2018 [eBook #56360]

Language: English

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The Daily Telegraph
WAR BOOKS

HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR

The Daily Telegraph
WAR BOOKS

Cloth Post
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HOW THE WAR BEGAN
By W.L. COURTNEY. LL.D., and J.M. KENNEDY

THE FLEETS AT WAR
By ARCHIBALD HURD

THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN
By GEORGE HOOPER

THE CAMPAIGN ROUND LIEGE
By J.M. KENNEDY

IN THE FIRING LINE
By A. ST. JOHN ADCOCK

GREAT BATTLES OF THE WORLD
By STEPHEN CRANE
Author of "The Red Badge of Courage."

BRITISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT
The story of their Battle Honours.

THE RED CROSS IN WAR
By Miss MARY FRANCES BILLINGTON

FORTY YEARS AFTER
The Story of the Franco-German War. By H.C. BAILEY.
With an Introduction by W.L. COURTNEY, LL.D.

A SCRAP OF PAPER
The Inner History of German Diplomacy.
By E.J. DILLON

HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR
A companion volume to "How the War Began," telling how the world faced
Armageddon and how the British Army answered the call to arms.
By J.M. KENNEDY

AIR-CRAFT IN WAR
By S. ERIC BRUCE

FAMOUS FIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIVE
REGIMENTS

THE TRIUMPHANT RETREAT TO PARIS
THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE

OTHER VOLUMES IN PREPARATION

PUBLISHED FOR THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
BY HODDER & STOUGHTON, WARWICK SQUARE,
LONDON, E.C.

HOW THE NATIONS
WAGED WAR

A companion Volume to "How the War Began" telling how the World faced Armageddon, and how the British Empire answered the call to arms

BY

J.M. KENNEDY

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXIV

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I | PAGE

The "Scrap of Paper"—Sir Edward Grey's further Statement—The Houses of Parliament and Belgium—Indian Troops—The German White Book

7

CHAPTER II |
German Press Campaign—Disseminating False News—The Secret Press Society—Sir E. Goschen's Report—A Suppressed Telegram | 44
CHAPTER III |
Position of Italy—German Intrigues—The Triple Alliance—Turkey's Activity—Plans for Attacking Egypt—A British Warning | 78
CHAPTER IV |
Polish Independence—The Tsar's Rescript—Japanese Action—Germany in the Far East—Samoa and Togoland | 100
CHAPTER V |

French Government leaves Paris—Triple Entente Declaration—An Important French Protest to the Powers—Aid from Dominions and India—South Africa's Expedition—The King's Proclamations

121

CHAPTER VI |

The Economic Position—Moratorium Extension—Great Britain's Oversea Trade—Germany's Commerce—Question of Food Supplies—Importance of the Balkans—"Petrograd"

165

CHAPTER I

The "Scrap of Paper"—Sir Edward Grey's further Statement—The Houses of Parliament and Belgium—Indian Troops—The German White Book.

Since the first volume of this series appeared, additional particulars respecting the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of war have been made known; and to these, with some further details which have not hitherto been sufficiently emphasized, the attention of the public may now be usefully directed.

On August 27th, the Foreign Office issued an important dispatch from Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German Government. It is dated London, August 8th, and contains a complete account of the Ambassador's final interviews with Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister; with Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State; and with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor. It was in the course of the interview with the latter that the Chancellor referred to the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, in a phrase which had become notorious, as a "scrap of paper." The document giving Sir E. Goschen's dispatch is as follows:

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th inst.,[1] I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of his Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.

It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,[2] and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office, and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram, and, pointing out that you had mentioned twelve o'clock as the time when his Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequence which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same.

I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, his Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.

I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument.

As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread, and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the Embassy, and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before nine p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.[3]

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well as or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that his Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by twelve o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr von Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr von Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the Berliner Tageblatt, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before his Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the Embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble-stones into the drawing-room where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorized by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances.

It was the "pestilential Tageblatt," which had somehow got hold of the news, and had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the Embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

Another remarkable passage in the Dispatch is that in which Sir E. Goschen describes the Kaiser's indignation and his resolve to divest himself of his English titles:

On the following morning, August 5th, the Emperor sent one of his Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message: "The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of these titles."

This resolve was made known in a manner which indicated that the attitude of the English Government was keenly felt at Potsdam. "I would add," remarks the Ambassador, "that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery."

The Dispatch continues:

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about eleven o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night, as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow, couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the Embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds, which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped, from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside, and inside, hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the Embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us, and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

At the sitting of the House of Commons on August 26th, Mr. Keir Hardie exhibited a tendency to quibble and to show his own country in a wrong light. His interference on this occasion was, from his point of view, fruitless; but it had the advantage of enabling the Foreign Secretary to make an effective reply. In his statement, Sir Edward Grey dealt with a few points which, although not at all obscure, were all the better for emphasizing. The temper of the House is sufficiently well indicated by the cheers and interruptions recorded in the following report:

Mr. Keir Hardie (Lab., Merthyr Tydvil) inquired of the Foreign Secretary whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by the German Ambassador, together with his invitation to the Foreign Secretary to put forward proposals of his own, which would be acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered by the Cabinet; and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reaching possibilities were thus rejected.

Sir E. Grey: These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador on August 1st, and without authority, to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85, in the White Paper.[4] The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next morning—that is Sunday, August 2nd—the conditions on which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. The German Chancellor had already been told, on July 30th, that we could not bargain that away.

On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House, accordingly.[5] I had seen the German Ambassador again, at his own request, on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning, and I had no time to record the conversation. Therefore, it does not appear in the White Paper; but it was impossible to withdraw that condition—(loud cheers)—without becoming a consenting party to the violation of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the communication described in No. 153 in the White Paper, about the neutrality of Belgium.[6] Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that communication had not been received when the White Paper was printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the White Paper.[7]

I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123 in the White Paper when I spoke in the House on August 3rd.[8] If I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality, I must have referred to No. 85—the proposals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister subsequently.[9] This would have made the case against the German Government much stronger—(cheers)—than I did make it in my speech. I deliberately refrained from doing that then.

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German Ambassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his Government. He worked for peace, but real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace failed. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie: May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up negotiations with Germany, on the basis of the suggestions here set forth by the German Ambassador?

Sir E. Grey: The German Ambassador did not make any basis of suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal initiative, and without authority, asked whether we would formulate the conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, and the conditions were stated in the House and made known to the German Ambassador. (Cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie (who rose amidst cries of "Order," "Oh, oh!" and "Sit down"): May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated these suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort at all was made to find out how far the German Government would have agreed to the suggestions put forward by their Ambassador? (Cries of "Don't answer.")

Mr. T.M. Healy (Ind. Nat., Cork, N.E.): Before the right hon. gentleman answers that, may I ask him if the Socialists in the Reichstag are asking any questions like this? (Loud and prolonged general cheers.)

Sir E. Grey, who was greeted with cries of "Don't answer," said: I should like to have no misunderstanding on this. (Loud cheers.) The German Ambassador did not make to us suggestions different to those which his Government made. He never suggested to us that the German Government would be able to agree to the condition of the neutrality of Belgium. On the contrary he did suggest to me that we should not put that condition forward because he was afraid his Government would not be able to accept it. (Cheers.)

Mr. Pringle (R., Lanarkshire, N.W.): Is my right hon. friend aware that Mr. Keir Hardie is constantly representing in the country that these proposals were actually made by the German Government to England? (Hear, hear.)

Sir. E. Grey: That was one of the reasons why I thought it very desirable to answer very explicitly. (General cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie: On a point of personal explanation I entirely repudiate the statement made by Mr. Pringle.

Mr. Pringle: I have to say in answer to that personal imputation that my authority is a letter written by Mr. Hardie in the Ardrossan and Saltcoats Herald last Saturday. (Cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie: Those who cheer have not seen the letter. (Cries of "Sit down.")

Mr. Pringle: Coward.

Mr. King (R., Somerset, N.) asked the Foreign Secretary whether he intended to lay upon the table copies of the German memorandum and the official statements of other foreign Governments showing the different explanations of the origin of the war which had been published by the various Governments concerned in the European war.

Sir E. Grey: I have received no official explanation of the nature referred to, except such as appear in our White Paper recently published.

Mr. King also asked whether Sir E. Grey was aware that the German Government had presented gratis to certain American citizens copies of a pamphlet, written in English, called "Germany's Reasons for War with Russia"; and whether, with a view of permitting an answer to this publication, he would obtain a copy and place it in the Library.

Sir E. Grey replied that he had given instructions for a copy of the document in question to be placed in the Library at the disposal of members.

On page 147 of this volume appears a reference to the German White Book, which was issued at Berlin on August 3rd. This White Book was intended to show that war with Russia was inevitable, and it was brought down to August 1st. In other words, while it dealt more or less adequately with the situation as between Russia and Germany, it threw no light on the ultimate causes which led to war with this country. The Memorandum of this German White Book has already been summarized (p. 147-8) and two telegrams—one from the Kaiser to the Tsar on July 31st, and the Tsar's reply of the same date—have been quoted on p. 148-9. The Manchester Guardian of August 24th contained translations of telegrams which had been exchanged previously by the two Emperors on the preceding days, i.e., from July 28th to July 30th, as follows:

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

July 28th, 10.45 p.m.

I hear with the utmost disquietude of the impression created in your realm by Austria-Hungary's proceedings against Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has for years been carried on in Servia has led to the appalling crime of which the Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand was the victim. The spirit which animated the murder of their own king and queen is still supreme in that country. Doubtless you will agree with me that we two, that you as well as I, and all sovereigns have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for the hideous deed should receive the punishment they deserve.

On the other hand, I am far from overlooking the difficulties you and your government may find in opposing the tendency of public opinion. Remembering the hearty friendship which for long has bound us two securely together, I am throwing the whole of my influence into the scale to induce Austria-Hungary to seek for an open and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I confidently hope for your assistance in my endeavours to put aside all the difficulties that may arise.

Your sincerely devoted friend and cousin,

(Signed) William.

The Tsar to the Kaiser.

Peterhof Palace,
July 29th, 1.0 p.m.

I rejoice that you are back in Germany. I beg you earnestly to help me at this grave moment. A shameful war has been declared on a weak country, and there is immense indignation in Russia, which I fully share. I foresee that I shall very soon be unable to hold out longer against the pressure exercised upon me, and shall be compelled to adopt measures which will lead to war. To obviate such a misfortune as a European war, I implore you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.

(Signed) Nicholas.

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

July 29th, 6.30 p.m.

I have received your telegram, and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. But I cannot, as I said in my first telegram to you, regard Austria-Hungary's action as a "shameful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Servia's promises are wholly unreliable if merely written on paper. In my view Austria-Hungary's action is to be regarded as an attempt to secure guarantees that Servia's promises shall be really translated into action. I am strengthened in this view by the declaration of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary aims at no territorial acquisitions at Servia's expense. I think, therefore, that it is entirely possible for Russia to maintain the rôle of a spectator of the Austro-Servian war without dragging Europe into the most awful war it has ever experienced. I believe that a direct understanding between your government and Vienna is possible and desirable, and, as I already telegraphed to you, my government has done all in its power to further such an understanding. Military measures on Russia's part, which Austria-Hungary could view as a threat, would naturally hasten a misfortune which we both wish to avoid, and would undermine the position of mediator which I have readily assumed in response to your appeal to my friendship and help.

(Signed) William.

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

July 30th, 1.0 a.m.

My Ambassador is instructed to draw the attention of your government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation: I said the same to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has only mobilised against Servia, and only a part of its army. If, as appears from your communication and that of your government, Russia is mobilising against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator which you entrusted to me in friendly wise, and which I accepted at your express request, is jeopardised, if not rendered impossible. The whole burden of decision now rests upon your shoulders, the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) William.

The Tsar to the Kaiser,

Peterhof,
July 30th, 1.20 p.m.

From my heart I thank you for your speedy reply. I am this evening sending Tatisheff with instructions. The military measures now coming into operation were decided upon five days ago for reasons of defence against Austria's preparations. Most heartily do I trust that these measures will in no way influence your position as mediator, which I value highly. We need your strong pressure on Austria to secure an understanding with us.

(Signed) Nicholas.

The two final telegrams have been given on pp. 148-150 of "How the War Began."

On July 28th, a confidential communication was sent by the Imperial Chancellor to the Governments of the various Federal States of Germany. After recapitulating the story of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, it proceeds as follows:

There are certain Russian voices accordingly who hold that it is a self-evident right and the business of Russia to intervene actively on Servia's behalf in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. The Novoye Vremya actually thinks that the responsibility for the European conflagration that would result from such action on the part of Russia can be thrown upon Germany, in so far as Germany does not cause Austria-Hungary to give way. But here the Russian Press is looking at things upside down. It was not Austria-Hungary which started the conflict with Servia, but Servia, which, by its unscrupulous encouragement of Greater Servian aspirations, even within Austria-Hungary, endangered the very existence of the Monarchy, and created a condition of things which finally found expression in the atrocious deed of Sarajevo. If Russia believes it must intervene in the conflict on behalf of Servia, its right is no doubt good, so far as it goes. But in doing so it must know that it thereby takes over as its own all Servia's endeavours to undermine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that on it will rest the sole responsibility if the Austro-Servian business, which all the other great Powers desire to localise, leads to a European war. Russia's responsibility is clear, and the heavier in that Count Berchtold has officially informed Russia that there is no intention of territorial acquisition at Servia's expense, or any tampering with the continued existence of the Servian kingdom—merely a desire for peace from the Servian machinations which imperil its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clear. The final goal of the agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavists against Austria-Hungary is, by breaking down the Danube Monarchy, to burst or weaken the Triple Alliance, and subsequently to isolate the German Empire completely. Our own interest, therefore, calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the duty of preserving Europe, so far as may be possible, from universal war, likewise directs us to support the endeavour to localise the conflict, thereby adhering to that straight line of policy which we have now pursued with success for forty-four years in the interest of the maintenance of European peace. If, however, contrary to what we hope, the interference (Eingreifen) of Russia causes an extension of the conflagration, faithful to our alliance, we should have to support the neighbour Monarchy with the whole might of the Empire. Only under compulsion shall we grasp the sword, but if we do, it will be with the calm consciousness that we are guiltless of the disaster which a war must bring upon the peoples of Europe.

This "calm consciousness" does not seem to have been disturbed by the reflection that in the spring of 1913, when Europe appeared to be settling down to a period of peace and prosperity after the Tripoli and Balkan wars, the German Government suddenly startled the whole world by imposing a special war levy of £50,000,000, and by increasing the peace strength of the German army to 870,000 men. Under the Quinquennial Army Law of 1905, the peace footing of the German army was largely increased and reached a total of 505,839 men in 1911. A new Quinquennial Law was voted by the Reichstag in 1911, and if it had been carried into effect the army would have had the strength of 515,221 in 1915-6. This, one would have thought, was surely a sufficient peace establishment; but in 1912 a still further Army Law provided for new units and also for increases in the peace effective. Hardly were the provisions of this law being applied when the special measure of 1913 was passed. The German army, in other words, rose from a peace strength of 505,000 men (excluding the one-year volunteers) in 1911 to a peace strength of about 512,000 in 1912, and a peace strength of 870,000 in the spring of 1914. There were no corresponding increases in any European army to call for this drastic strengthening of the German forces. Indeed, the French army had rather become reduced in numbers in consequence of the two years' service; and the Balkan States were exhausted. The Servia which had advanced against Turkey in the autumn of 1912 was a very much more powerful country than the Servia with which Austria picked a quarrel in 1914.

We were never told why this great increase in the German army was rendered necessary; nor did we learn why, at almost the same time, the Austrian Government voted huge sums for enlarging its land and sea forces. There was a vague reference in the Reichstag to the balance of military power. But, if the Balkan war had altered the military power of Europe, it had altered that power to the advantage of the Triple Alliance. The Balkan States, the perpetual menace of the Danube Monarchy, if we are to credit the statements made at Vienna, were exhausted after their campaigns, first against Turkey and then against one another. Austria herself had had her way with regard to Albania, and Russia had given up her project of securing an outlet on the Adriatic for Servia. Italy, the third partner in the Triplice, was beginning to recover from the effects of the Tripoli war; and France and England wished for nothing better than to be let alone.

If we received but little information regarding the strengthening of the German army, assuredly we had been receiving less for years previously regarding the construction of strategic railways on the German border where it meets Belgium and Luxemburg. An examination of a detailed map of this district will show the most careless observer that the strong German fortresses and garrison towns of Cologne, Coblenz, and Germersheim, are connected with the western frontiers by railway lines the only possible use of which must have been the transportation of troops and munitions of war. There is certainly no trade in western Germany demanding such a large number of tracks running east and west; and it was only by means of these railways that Germany was able to throw a million men across the frontier in less than forty-eight hours after war broke out. The pacific intentions of France may be judged from the fact that the lines on the French side of the frontier run for the most part north and south.

One or two such items may pass. But when we consider them seriatim, we are bound to admit that Germany has shown consistent provocation for more than a decade. We may leave out of account, perhaps, the Kruger telegram and the German desire to assist Spain against the United States in 1898, not to mention the attitude of Germany at the time of the Boer war. There remains an entire series of provocations; the preamble to the first German Navy Act (1900), in which England as the enemy is all but mentioned by name; the visit of the Kaiser to Tangier; the bullying indulged in by the German representatives at the Algeciras Conference; the trouble almost forced on France over the Morocco question in 1907; the determined attitude taken up by the Kaiser against all Europe at the time of the Turkish revolution and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria, in 1908-9; the stringent terms of the Potsdam Agreement with Russia in 1910; the sending of the Panther to Agadir in 1911; the intractable attitude of the Wilhelmstrasse over the settlement of the Balkan question in 1912-13. With some effort, perhaps, any one of these incidents—and these are only a few of the more important—might be explained away with a veneer of plausibility; but, taken together, they are overwhelming in their proof that the German Empire has been a hotbed of unrest in Europe, not merely for the last two or three years, but for the last twenty. Where Germany led Austria followed; and numerous were the threats and imprecations levelled at Italy through the pliable medium of the semi-official Press because Rome did not always see eye to eye with Berlin and Vienna.

The remaining telegrams and other documents quoted by the Manchester Guardian need not detain us long. From the dispatches of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to his Government at Berlin, it is clear that the Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonoff, laid the entire blame at the door of Austria. No impartial statesman, as we can see from our own White Paper, attempted to justify an ultimatum that demanded a reply within forty-eight hours. The following messages, however, are worth noting, and they help to complete our own official documents:

From the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

July 27th.

The military attaché reports conversation with War Minister:

Sazonoff has asked the latter to explain the situation to me. The Minister of War gave me his word of honour that no mobilisation order had as yet been given. Certain preparatory measures had been taken; that was all: no reservists had been called up, no horses commandeered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier mobilisation would take place in the military districts touching upon Austria: Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan. Under no circumstances in those on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was earnestly desired. On my inquiry as to the purpose of mobilisation against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to diplomacy. I said to the Minister that we did justice to their friendly intentions towards us, but that even mobilisation directed solely against Austria would be regarded as highly threatening.

On July 28th—by which date Germany must have nearly completed her arrangements for invading France through Belgium—we find the Foreign Minister informing the Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, that Germany is ready to co-operate with the other Powers in mediating between Austria and Russia; and on July 29th France is warned that Germany may be compelled to declare martial law. On July 31st the ultimatum was sent to St. Petersburg and a similar warning to Paris.

The following message was sent to St. Petersburg on August 1st:

In case the Russian Government should not give a satisfactory answer to our demand, your Excellency will at five o'clock this afternoon (Central European time) hand it the following declaration, in French: "Since the beginning of the crisis the Imperial Government has endeavoured to bring about a peaceful solution. In conformity with the wish expressed to him by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in agreement with England, was endeavouring to act as mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without waiting for the results of his efforts, proceeded to mobilise the whole of its land and sea forces.

"As the result of this threatening step, for which no motive was afforded by any miltary preparation on Germany's part, the German Empire found itself face to face with a serious and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed to parry this danger it would have compromised the security and even the existence of Germany. Consequently the German Government found itself compelled to address the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and to insist on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia having refused the satisfaction of this demand, and having shown by this refusal that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honour to inform your Excellency, by my Government's command, as follows:

"His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, raises the gage in the Empire's name and regards himself as in a state of war with Russia. (Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relève le défi et se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.)

"Please demand your papers and protection and put your affairs under the protection of the American Embassy."

Among the numerous indications of loyalty which reached Great Britain from her oversea dominions and colonies, those from India were not the least striking and demonstrative. As many of the Indian princes offered not merely money, but also men, it was decided that representative contingents of Indian soldiers should take their places on the battlefield side by side with their fellow-subjects from these Islands and the Dominions. The announcement was made in the House of Lords on August 28th by Earl Kitchener in the following words:

"In addition to reinforcements that will shortly proceed from this country, the Government have decided that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops from India.

"The first division of those troops is now on its way. I may add that all wastage in the Army in France has been immediately filled up, and there are some 12,000 men waiting for that purpose on the lines of communication."

To Lord Kitchener's brief announcement the Secretary for India added an explanation which the public welcomed with feelings of gratification.

"It has been deeply impressed upon us," he said, "from what we have heard from India, that the wonderful wave of enthusiasm and loyalty which is now passing over that country is, to a great extent, based upon the desire of the Indian people that Indian soldiers should stand side by side with their comrades of the British Army in repelling the invasion of our friends' territories and the attacks made upon them."

Hardly less enthusiasm had been aroused on the previous day, August 27th, when Mr. Asquith moved:

"That an Address be presented to his Majesty praying him to convey to his Majesty the King of the Belgians the sympathy and admiration with which this House regards the heroic resistance offered by his army and people to the wanton invasion of his territory, and an assurance of the determination of this country to support in every way the efforts of Belgium to vindicate her own independence and the public law of Europe."

In supporting his motion the Prime Minister delivered an eloquent and moving speech, in the course of which he said:

"Very few words are needed to commend to the House the Address the terms of which will shortly be read from the Chair. The war which is now shaking to its foundations the whole European system originated in a quarrel in which this country had no direct concern. We strove with all our might, as everyone now knows, to prevent its outbreak, and when that was no longer possible to limit its area. It is all-important, and I think it is relevant to this motion, that it should be clearly understood when it was and why it was that we intervened.

"It was only when we were confronted with the choice between keeping and breaking solemn obligations, between the discharge of a binding trust and of shameless subservience to naked force, that we threw away the scabbard.

"We do not repent our decision.

"The issue was one which no great and self-respecting nation, certainly none bred and nurtured as ourselves in this ancient home of liberty could, without undying shame, have declined. We were bound by our obligations, plain and paramount, to assert and maintain the threatened independence of a small and neutral State. Belgium had no interest of her own to serve, save and except the one supreme and over-riding interest of every State, great or little, which is worthy of the name, the preservation of her integrity and of her national life.

"History tells us that the duty of asserting and maintaining the great principle, which is, after all, the well-spring of civilisation and of progress, has fallen once and again at the most critical moment in the past to States relatively small in area and in population, but great in courage and resolve, to Athens and Sparta, the Swiss cantons, and not least gloriously three centuries ago to the Netherlands. Never, sir, I venture to assert, has the duty been more clearly and bravely acknowledged, and never has it been more strenuously and heroically discharged than during the last weeks by the Belgian King and the Belgian people.

"They have faced without flinching, and against almost incalculable odds, the horrors of an irruption, devastation, of spoliation, and of outrage. They have stubbornly withstood and successfully arrested the inrush, wave after wave, of a gigantic and overwhelming force. The defence of Liège will always be the theme of one of the most inspiring chapters in the annals of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves the immortal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to ease, to security, even to life itself. We are proud of their alliance and their friendship. We salute them with respect and with honour. We are with them heart and soul, because by their side and in their company we are defending at the same time two great causes—the independence of small States and the sanctity of international covenants—and we assure them, as I ask the House in this Address to do, in the name of this United Kingdom and of the whole Empire, that they may count to the end on our whole-hearted and unfailing support."

The reception which this speech met with was unmistakable; and the motion was voted unanimously.

Mr. Bonar Law, in seconding, spoke with great feeling of the shameful atrocities committed upon the Belgian people by the German soldiery, and, in the Upper House, Lord Crewe, referring to the same theme, observed that no country ever outraged humanity without sooner or later paying for it: "It must be our part to see that the sword is not sheathed till these great wrongs are redressed to the full."

Lord Lansdowne spoke of the "incalculable value" of the two or three weeks gained by the heroic defence of Belgium; and Mr. Redmond, in a few glowing sentences, bore witness to the generous enthusiasm which had been excited in Ireland. There was no sacrifice, he said, which Ireland was not willing to make for Belgium, and he suggested that, instead of the loan of £10,000,000 which had been proposed, the Belgian people should be asked to receive the money as a gift.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] In this telegram, which is quoted in full on p. 178 of "How the War Began," Sir Edward Grey reproduced the appeal of the King of the Belgians to King George for diplomatic intervention, and asked for an assurance that the German demand on Belgium for permission to pass troops over Belgian territory would not be persisted in.

[2] This was the British ultimatum, in which Sir Edward Grey recapitulated the circumstances connected with the German occupation of Belgian territory and demanded an answer by midnight. Quoted in full on page 180-1 of "How the War Began."

[3] This telegram, says a footnote to the dispatch, never reached the Foreign Office.

[4] This letter has been quoted in full on p. 106 of "How the War Began."

[5] Sir Edward Grey's speech appears ibid., p. 150 foll.

[6] This refers to Sir Edward Grey's telegram to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, which is given on p. 178 of "How the War Began."

[7] Sir E. Goschen's report has been given at the beginning of this chapter.

[8] Quoted on p. 136-7 of "How the War Began." In this dispatch to Sir E. Goschen, Sir Edward Grey states that he refused to give any undertaking even if the French colonies were respected, saying that England must keep her hands free.

[9] See footnote No. 1.

CHAPTER II

German Press Campaign—Disseminating False News—The Secret Press Society—Sir E. Goschen's Report—A Suppressed Telegram.

It has been indicated in the preceding volumes in this series that the plans of the German Government had been very well thought out before the campaign was undertaken. When hostilities had been engaged only a few weeks, evidence came to hand from many parts of the world that the determination of the Kaiser and his advisers to wage war was no sudden whim, no definite stroke of policy dependent upon unexpected circumstances. For example, the proclamations issued by the German consuls in South Africa summoning reservists to the colours had been printed in Germany, it was ascertained, and sent out about the end of April or the beginning of May—in other words, some two months before the assassination of the heir-apparent to the Austrian throne, which was the nominal cause of the dispatch of the Austrian Note and consequently of the general European War.

Again, certain German merchant vessels in Australasian waters were observed on July 30th—i.e. the day before Germany declared war on Russia—to begin conveying wireless messages to one another in code. It was commented upon at the time that this was an unusual practice, especially as these steamers, with equal suddenness, refused to answer the wireless messages of British vessels. In other words, two or three days before the campaign was actually opened, means were found of notifying German vessels on the other side of the world that peace was about to be broken.

Nor were these the only preparations. Those who are interested in modern German history will well remember that practically every book relating to Bismarck's career emphasises time and again the use he made of all sections of the Press, independently of party and even of country. His agents, even before the war with Austria in 1866, and, of course, for long afterwards, were at all times endeavouring to bribe, cajole, or persuade newspaper editors in Germany, Russia, Italy, France, England, America and even Turkey and the Balkan States, to insert this or that article or paragraph, tending to assist in some way the achievement of the aims for the time being of the Monarch's most trusted adviser. Bismarck carried this employment of the Press to a very high degree of perfection; and readers of Busch's anecdotes in particular will recollect how often the unfortunate amanuensis was scolded for not writing what he had been told to write in the manner of the particular paper for which his article was intended.

This was one of the most useful diplomatic and political legacies bequeathed by the great Chancellor to the Germany of our own generation, and it is hardly necessary to add that both before and during the present war full advantage has been taken of it. It is no exaggeration whatever to say that in every country of importance throughout the world the most strenuous endeavours were made by the German Press agents to disseminate Germany's point of view—to show at the beginning that both Germany and Austria, particularly Germany, were two innocent but ill-used countries which were reluctantly compelled to go to war with their powerful neighbours, as, if they had remained inactive a day longer, they would have risked their very existence as independent States; and to show later on that, with the help of Providence, the German armies were winning remarkable victories all along the line.

Indeed, if we were to believe the German Press Bureau, the mere fact that the Fatherland had entered the lists was sufficient to cause panic among her enemies. Before the campaign had been in progress three days, the world was solemnly informed from German sources that a revolution had broken out in Paris, and that the President had fled from the city; that a similar revolution was breaking out in Russia, and that the Tsar's throne was in danger; and that the British Expeditionary Force could not be landed in France as the Channel was held by German warships and submarines. Subsequently we were told that Lord Kitchener's appeal for half a million men had utterly failed; that the British Fleet dare not venture to leave the coast on account of German warships and German mines, and that innumerable British merchantmen had been captured or sunk by German cruisers in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, and in the Mediterranean.

If these idle stories seem to us to be merely ridiculous, let it be remembered that they were retailed as solemn facts to newspapers in Italy, the Balkans, Turkey, Egypt and South America. Fully aware of the power of the newspaper, and determined that Germany's prestige should not be lost, the Berlin Government made the most complete preparations for fighting with the pen as well as with the sword; and it is rather unfortunate that this very common-sense example was not followed or had not been thought of by England, France, or Russia. One example may be given. As we now know, and as even the Germans themselves have admitted, the fighting which took place on the Mons-Charleroi line resulted in stalemate. The Germans were practically fought to a standstill, and the allied forces, in accordance with their own pre-arranged plan of campaign, effected gradually and in good order their retreat to their original base. German prisoners admitted that the small British force which had the noble but exceedingly arduous task of defending the left wing of the French army inflicted damage on the enemy out of all proportion to their numbers. The coolness of the British soldiers under a heavy fire, their intrepidity in hand-to-hand fighting, and the almost incredible accuracy of their markmanship were commented upon no less by their allies than by their foes.

Contrast this with the German version, which was circulated wherever a newspaper could be induced to print it. It was said that a great battle, lasting several days, had taken place in the neighbourhood of Mons, that the French had been driven back several miles with heavy loss, and that the "contemptible" British Expeditionary Force had been all but annihilated. This version was communicated to the Italian Press, and a suitable correction did not make an appearance until five days had elapsed. When the correction did appear, one Italian newspaper headed the news with the significant announcement: "Telegrams from London reach us in four days; telegrams from Berlin in two hours."

The result of this feature of this Press campaign was that many countries with which the Allies wished to stand well, such as Italy, Turkey, Spain, and Servia, continually received the impression that the German cause, German might, and German organisation were about to triumph in 1914 as they had in 1870. To some extent the scheme did not succeed. When, for instance, unrest was noticed among the natives in the French sphere of interest in Morocco, the Spaniards in the neighbouring sphere offered voluntarily to put it down, as France had withdrawn many of her troops. In Italy, again, the feeling in favour of the Allies had been so pronounced from the very beginning that not even telegrams from Berlin could shake it. In Turkey, on the other hand, it was difficult, if not, indeed, impossible, to have the German "news" corrected; and the utmost endeavours were openly made by German agents to induce the Turks to strike at the Allies either by an invasion of Egypt, an attack on Suez Canal shipping, or a raid into Southern Russia. It is significant enough that when the German battleship Goeben eluded the British squadron in the Mediterranean, she sought shelter, not in any of the ports of Germany's ally, Austria—which at the time were not beyond her reach—but under the shelter of Turkish forts in the Dardanelles. This incident is referred to in a subsequent chapter.

Although small and not very important items of news appeared from time to time in the British and French Press respecting the operations of the German Press Bureau (a department of the Foreign Office), it was not until early in September that anything like a complete account of the ramifications of this Bureau was made known. On September 3rd a White Paper was issued containing dispatches from Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. These communications began in February, 1914, and continued until June. They showed conclusively that a secret undertaking had been entered into which had for its object the influencing of the Press of foreign countries, partly in the interest of German exporters and partly in order that German influence generally might be spread. It is, of course, impossible to quote at all fully from these very interesting dispatches of Sir E. Goschen, but one or two of them may be mentioned. In his first dispatch, sent on February 27th, our Ambassador at Berlin enclosed the following report:

For some time past a variety of schemes had been ventilated in the Press with the object of improving German prestige abroad. It was said that in certain foreign parts Germany was being persistently and wrongfully abused, that she could obtain no fair hearing because the Press of those distant countries was in hands hostile to any German enterprise, and because the telegraphic agencies serving those countries were equally biassed. An "Association for World-Commerce" was to have remedied this evil by a persistent pro-German propaganda in the countries most bitterly complained of. It was hoped that the necessary funds could have been raised by contributions from all the trading and industrial societies interested in the German export trade, and, in view of the supreme importance to Germany of her export trade, it was intended that agents of the Association should be sent and stationed abroad to assist the exporting industries by timely advice and an active policy generally, such as private individuals could pursue more effectively than officials. The opportunity for realising this scheme seemed to offer itself under the following circumstances. A plan was being prepared to start a German-American Economic Society. Similar societies with an application to other countries already exist—e.g., a German-Argentine Society, a German-Canadian Society, a German-Russian Society, etc. The foundation of a German-American Society had been advocated in connection with the revision of the American tariff which gave German industries new chances of an intensified export to the United States. As was natural in any matters dealing with German-American affairs, M. Ballin, of the Hamburg-America Line, was approached to take the matter in hand. He consented. Under his inspiration the idea of a German-American Society was abandoned and the idea of a World Society was substituted. A preliminary meeting was held at which the various German-foreign societies were represented; there were present also representatives of the "Central Association of German Industrials," and of its great rival, the "Federation of Industrials," as well as of most of the leading industrial firms. Internal dissensions, however, soon appeared, and several important members sent in their resignations. The details of the foundation were to have been settled at a meeting convened for February 26th; to-day the whole scheme stands prorogued sine die. If it is ever realised its plan will have to be considerably altered. In the meantime the original plan of a German-American Society has been revived. This society is, in fact, to be constituted in Berlin early in March in the form originally intended.

It would seem strange had M. Ballin so readily accepted defeat. The explanation lies in the fact that, at the request of a very highly-placed person, his interest has been transferred to another more delicate and more or less secret organisation, devised to undertake those duties of M. Ballin's would-be "Weltverein," which concerned the German reputation abroad. A short time ago, a meeting, of which the secret has been well kept, was convened in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of which Dr. Hamann, the notorious head of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office, was the originator and at which the Foreign Secretary himself was present. The meeting was attended by members of the leading industrial concerns of this country: the North German Lloyd, the Hamburg-America Company, the Deutsche Bank, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the Allgemeine Electrizitätsgesellschaft, Siemens and Halske, the Schuckert Works, Krupp, the Cruson Works, etc. They formed a private company with the purpose of "furthering the German industrial prestige abroad"—a conveniently vague purpose. The company will be financed by private subscriptions and by a Government grant. The sum at first suggested as a necessary revenue from private subscription was £12,500, but the company present at the first meeting was so enthusiastic that it definitely promised annual subscriptions amounting to £25,000. The Government will add £12,500 per annum—the whole Secret Service Fund, in fact, at the disposal of the Imperial Foreign Office for similar purposes (e.g., for the payment of subsidies to certain papers abroad). The company has entered into an agreement with the Agence Havas that the latter will in future only publish news concerning Germany if supplied through Wolff's Telegraphen-Bureau. The latter will receive its German news exclusively from the new company.

The company intends to make a similar arrangement with Reuter's Telegraphic Bureau for those foreign countries in which Reuter controls telegraphic communications. If Reuter declines, the Deutsche Kabelgesellschaft, a smaller German news agency supplying telegrams from certain countries (e.g., Mexico) and working in agreement with Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau, is to be financed by the new company to run a service in competition to Reuter's. All the concerns represented at the meeting have furthermore agreed to pay into the company's hotchpot the very vast sums which they are accustomed to spend abroad for their advertisements in foreign papers. The total of this item alone is believed to be not less than £25,000 per annum—so the annual sum available for the purpose of the new company will reach a total of £50,000 to £75,000. The company will in future issue the advertisements of its members only to those foreign papers which publish German information originating exclusively from the new company, which is to be regarded as the only authentic source of information concerning Germany and all things German. This information they are to receive free of cost or at a nominal sum—so that the willing foreign papers will derive very material benefits from their collaboration with the company, viz., lucrative advertisements and free matter written in the language of the country in which the papers are published. The foreign Press is to be watched by the company's agents appointed in the various foreign centres. Any incorrect reports are to be telegraphed home and corrected by telegrams issued by the company. The countries in which the system is to be immediately inaugurated are chiefly the South American States and those of the Far East, but the system is to embrace all countries outside Europe. The German cable rates for Press telegrams are to be reduced in the interests of the new company. It is difficult to say whether the evil which the new company is to remedy really exists, or exists to any perceptible extent, but it is certain that a very influential private company has been called into existence with every official encouragement commanding an enormous revenue for the purposes of a pro-German newspaper propaganda. Whether the evil exists or not—the money will be spent on secret service to popularise Germany abroad. It does not seem to have occurred to the promoters of the scheme that they are preparing the ground for a vast system of international blackmail—hardly a proper way to reach the desired end.

That a reduction in cable rates was actually in contemplation is seen from the Ambassador's next dispatch on the subject, as follows:

Berlin,

April 3rd, 1914.

Sir,—In my despatch of the 27th February last concerning the secret foundation of a German society to supply the foreign Press of certain countries with news favourable to Germany and German interests, it was foreshadowed that German cable rates for Press telegrams would probably be reduced in the interests of the new society.

I have the honour now to report that, in fact, reduced rates for telegrams to the United States, Canada, Argentine, Chile, Peru, and the German colonies are to come into operation as from April 1st, 1914. These telegrams, which are to be officially known as week-end telegrams, will be admitted at a reduced rate between Saturday midnight and Sunday midnight, to be delivered on Monday or Tuesday respectively. These week-end telegrams must have reached the cable station at Emden before midnight on Saturday, but can be handed in at any telegraph office in the course of the week.

The rates, which in some cases represent a reduction to one-fourth of the usual rates fixed, are:

Pfennigs
per word.

To New York, Canada, Argentina, Chile, Peru (minimum charge for each telegram 20 M.) | 80
To Togo and Cameroons (minimum charge 18 M.) | 90
To German South-West Africa (minimum charge 15 M.) | 75

Negotiations are pending for extending the week-end telegram service to other distant countries.

Telegrams sent to the United States or Canada are sent at the reduced rate only to New York or Montreal respectively; thence they are forwarded either free of charge, by letter, or at the local telegram rates per word by telegram.—I have, etc.,

W.E. Goschen.

Within a month this system—for the intrinsic merits of which there is everything to be said—was extended; and Sir E. Goschen wrote to the Foreign Minister:

Berlin,

May 2nd, 1914.

Sir,—With reference to my despatch of the 3rd ultimo, I have the honour to report that, according to an announcement in the North German Gazette, the system of reduced rates for what are called "week-end telegrams" is to be extended as from the 1st instant to Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State, Transvaal, South and North Rhodesia, Nyassaland, British India, Burma, Ceylon, Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and Labuan, under the conditions described in my above-mentioned despatch.

The rates are as follows:

| Pfennigs per word.
To Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, Transvaal | 70
To South Rhodesia, Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and Labuan | 80
To North Rhodesia and Nyassaland | 95
To British India, Burma, and Ceylon | 50

—I have, etc.,

W.E. Goschen.

Early in June a remarkable article on the subject appeared in a well-known German trade organ, the Deutsche Export Revue, which not only admitted the existence of the scheme, but confirmed the previous statement of the Ambassador, that it was being largely subsidised by the Imperial German Foreign Office. On this point Sir E. Goschen's dispatch and the article he encloses are illuminating:

Berlin,

June 9th, 1914.

Sir,—I had the honour, in my despatch of the 27th February last, to explain a scheme under which a society had been founded with the object of supplying the foreign Press, by telegraph, with information favourable to Germany generally and to German industrial enterprise in particular. I have since transmitted lists of the countries to which, under the name of "week-end telegrams," the cable rates have been very considerably reduced to assist the propaganda of the said society.

I to-day have the honour to forward a translation of a cutting from the Deutsche Export Revue, of the 5th June, 1914, in which the existence of the scheme is, for the first time, as far as I know, admitted in public print.

The Deutsche Export Revue, which is published in Berlin, is a weekly periodical devoted to the interests of the German export trade. It is regarded as well informed, and enjoys a good reputation generally.

The article confirms the various particulars set out in my despatch; it confirms more especially the fact that the Imperial Foreign Office is supporting the scheme with an annual subscription of £12,500 paid out of its secret service fund. It supplies a list of the members of the society, the names of the directors, etc. The last paragraph of the article merits special attention on account of a certain refreshing ingenuousness.

I am informed that the order has gone forth from high official quarters not to reproduce or in any way to refer to this article, as its inadvertent publication is not unnaturally considered extremely inopportune and embarrassing.—I have, etc.,

W.E. Goschen.

The article is as follows:

Our readers will remember that one of the items in the programme of the German Association for World Commerce was the establishment of a news service abroad on generous lines. Whilst the other parts of the Association's programme met with hostile criticism as soon as they became known, the proposed service for the supply of news abroad was greeted with general sympathy, as such activity promised to have a useful effect on our foreign relations. The failure to organise the Association for World Commerce seemed unhappily to render it doubtful whether the organisation of the news service could be realised. It is all the more gratifying that, according to information which has reached us from well-informed quarters, the scheme for a German news service in foreign countries has by no means been abandoned, but that, on the contrary, an extensive organisation is actually doing work in the desired direction.

A German syndicate was very quietly formed a few weeks ago for the purposes of this foreign news service. It uses the organisation of a news agency already in existence; its activity is gradually to be extended over the whole globe. Its main object will be to reply in an appropriate form to the prejudiced news concerning Germany and to the attacks made upon her, and by the judicious publication of newspapers inspiring the necessary articles to spread abroad the knowledge of the true state of German industry and of Germany's cultural achievements.

We are in a position to give the following information concerning the organisation of the enterprise. It is presided over by a directorate, consisting of three men, viz.: Privy Councillor von Borsig, "Landrath" Roetger (retired), and Herr Schacht, a director of the Deutsche Bank.

A special administrative board, the main duty of which it is to make suggestions as to the organisation and the methods of reporting comprises among others: Professor Duisburg, of the dye works, "Bayer"; Herr Hagen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Commercial Councillor Hasenclever, of Remscheid; Herr Hermann Hecht, of Berlin; Director Heineken, of the North German Lloyd; Director Helfferich, of the Deutsche Bank; Director Huldermann, of the Hamburg-America Line; Director Kosegarten, of the "Deutsche Waffen-und-Munitions-Fabrik"; Herr von Langen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Privy Councillor Rathenau; Director Reuter, of the Maschinen Fabrik, Duisburg; Director Salomonsohn, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Privy Councillor von Siemens; Herr Edmond Bohler, Hamburg, etc.

The management will be entrusted to two managers, Herr Asch and Dr. Hansen. The former has for years edited several foreign news agencies; the latter is known to the readers of the Deutsche Export Revue through a series of articles dealing with the question of a supply of news covering the whole world.

For the present the enterprise has taken the form of a loose syndicate constituted for three years, which is, later on, to be replaced by a more systematic form of organisation. The annual subscription payable by the firms which are members amounts to a minimum of £50. It is a significant fact that the Imperial Foreign Office has voted a grant of £12,500 towards the expenses of the syndicate, provided the same amount is contributed by German industrial houses. As the subscriptions and the contributions by the latter already exceed the sum of £12,500, the contribution from the Foreign Office funds seems secured. As every firm subscribing a sum of £50 has a vote, or, rather, as for every £50 subscribed the subscriber receives a vote, it may be expected that the Imperial Foreign Office will have a powerful and decisive influence upon the management of the syndicate generally and upon the development of the news service in particular.

We further learn that efforts are now being made to induce the joint German and Foreign Economic Societies to join the syndicate, as these societies embrace pre-eminently merchants and manufacturers interested in the German foreign trade. These societies, it is true, appear to be still divided in their opinion concerning the new enterprise—at least, so far no definite decision has been arrived at.

It is believed that an increasing membership will make it possible to establish a reserve fund out of subscriptions and voluntary contributions received, so that, later on, the interest of the reserve fund may suffice to defray the expenses of the news service. It is also hoped that the foreign Press may eventually be induced to pay for the news supplied. Finally, it is intended to send journalists to the various countries who are there to busy themselves in favour of German interests in the manner indicated above.

The task which the syndicate has set itself is in itself worthy of acknowledgment. But only the future can show whether the task can be accomplished in the manner indicated. We are of opinion that good results could be achieved, and perhaps with greater success, by utilising the German Legations and Consulates abroad, if ample funds for this purpose were placed at the disposal of the official Departments. At the same time, the joint German and Foreign Economic Societies might well, as indeed some of them already do, work quietly for a better appreciation abroad of the state of German industry and of German cultured progress. The intended despatch of journalists we believe, however, in any case to be a mistake, as it would certainly soon become common talk in the editorial offices in the several places abroad that they represent a syndicate officially supported by the German Empire. If such things are intended, it would be better to fall back upon gentlemen who are already in touch with the respective editorial offices, and who could serve German interests without attracting so much attention as would journalists sent out for the purpose.

The reference to Press agencies in Sir E. Goschen's original report brought forth prompt contradictions from those chiefly affected. On September 6th the Press Bureau in London officially issued the following important declaration on behalf of the Foreign Office:

Conclusive evidence produced by the "Agence Havas" has satisfied the Foreign Office that the statement occurring in the recently-published report forwarded by His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, that the "Agence Havas" had agreed in future to publish news concerning Germany only if supplied through "Wolff's Telegraphen Bureau," is not correct.

Such an arrangement appears to have been intended by the German organisation; but it is not one which the "Agence Havas" ever even contemplated.

It is with great satisfaction that the Foreign Office has been enabled to give publicity to this correction.

Messrs. Reuter also disclaimed all connection with the proceedings of the German Government, as will be seen from the following letter which appeared in the Daily Telegraph of September 7th:

To the Editor of "The Daily Telegraph."

Sir,—In consequence of the long connection which the Press Association has had with Reuter's Telegraph Company (Limited), I considered it my duty to at once communicate with Baron de Reuter respecting the White Paper which was published yesterday morning. I asked three questions:

(1) Whether Reuter's Company were aware that proceedings of the kind referred to by Sir Edward Goschen were contemplated by Dr. Hamann, the head of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office;

(2) Whether Reuter's Company had been approached either through Wolff's Bureau or in any other way; and

(3) Whether, before the publication of the White Paper, any communication had been made to Reuter's Company by the Foreign Office.

In view of the public interest attaching to this question, it seems desirable that the public at large, as well as the Press, should be placed in possession of the facts of the case. Accordingly, in agreement with Baron de Reuter, I append his reply:

Dear Mr. Robbins,—In reply to your letter of to-day calling my attention to the Parliamentary Paper issued in this morning's papers, concerning the manœuvres of the Berlin Press Bureau and the Kabelgesellschaft, I beg to say that the version put about by the said Press Bureau, and reported by the British Ambassador, does not tally with the facts within my knowledge.

In the first place, the Wolff Bureau looked on the Kabelgesellschaft as a competitor likely to supplant the older agency, because the latter had incurred disfavour with the authorities owing to its inability to induce the "Agence Havas" to publish, more particularly in South America, the news issued by the Press Bureau. So far from Havas agreeing to circulate the news, it was precisely because of the opposition to such a course by the French agency that the Kabelgesellschaft was taken under the special protection of the Berlin Press Bureau and the higher authorities in the background. In proof of this statement I have a letter from the director of the Wolff Bureau stating that the activity of the Kabelgesellschaft was aimed in the first instance at the "Agence Havas."

As for our agency, we have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Kabelgesellschaft, still less has any proposal in their name, or on their behalf, ever been submitted for our consideration. The fact, however, that for many months—I may even say years—past the German Press, at the bidding and under the inspiration of the political wirepullers, circulated unblushing falsehoods and calumnies about our agency, presumably to weaken its prestige in the contemplated competition, points to their intelligent anticipation of the refusal which any overtures from their side would have met with from us.

Finally, permit me to add that we had no knowledge of the intended publication of this Parliamentary paper.—Yours faithfully,

(Signed) Herbert de Reuter.

Yours faithfully,

E. Robbins, Manager.
Press Association (Ltd.), 14, New Bridge Street,
London, E.C., Sept. 5th.

What the German Press is really capable of when adequately inspired may be seen from a comparison of the semi-official organs the German Government published on Monday, August 31st, in places so far apart as Hamburg, Frankfurt-on-Main, and Wiesbaden. In these papers, and in identical phraseology, appeared the "report" of a speech alleged to have been delivered by Mr. John Burns in the Albert Hall, London, on August 14th. It will be remembered that Mr. Burns, with Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, withdrew from the Government early in the month, and the fabricated speech was officially given out in Germany as Mr. Burns's own explanation of his reasons for resigning. Even in its translated form the speech is remarkable in its way as showing that it must have in the first place been written by someone who was very familiar with the oratorical style of the right honourable gentleman; and attempts were made here and there to imitate Mr. Burns's occasional tendency to lapse into epigram and vigorous short sentences. For example, the phrase: "I will give it as my firm opinion that England's greatness shows itself in time of peace; her weakness in time of war," is certainly delivered in Mr. Burns's best vein, however greatly the sentiment may differ from his ideas. There would, of course, be no point in quoting from this speech, which, as was quite obvious when the English translation made its appearance, had never been delivered; but one passage should be given as an example of German thoroughness: "We destroyed Napoleon's fleet at Trafalgar; a few days later Napoleon gained his most glorious (sic) victory at Austerlitz and brought Europe to her knees. Of what use was our overthrow of Napoleon at sea compared with his unexampled successes on land? We merely pricked him with a pin—he overthrew Europe untroubled by our victories."

The argument here, it will be noticed, is exceedingly plausible; and the attributing of such an idea to Mr. Burns might almost appear to be convincing to Germans and Austrians who knew little of his eight years' record as an administrator and a great deal about his record as a Labour leader. Once again, too, there is an attempt at Mr. Burns's vigorous style. The full "speech" was reported in the English Press on September 7th, and was, of course, immediately repudiated on being shown to Mr. Burns.

If the German Press, however, can be used occasionally for reporting things that people did not say, it can be used with equal facility for suppressing important statements actually made. For example, a Reuter telegram from Copenhagen on September 7th quoted a statement taken from the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and published at Copenhagen by the German semi-official news agency. This statement dealt with Sir Edward Grey's declaration regarding his conversations with Prince Lichnowsky, the former German Ambassador to Great Britain, made in the House of Commons on August 28th:

The Norddeutsche says: "According to reports received here Sir E. Grey recently declared in the House of Commons that the correspondence exchanged between Great Britain and Germany before the war, as published by the German Government, was incomplete, that Prince Lichnowsky had withdrawn his report on the well-known telephone conversation by a telegram sent immediately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed, and that this telegram was not published. The Times, probably on this basis of official information, made the same assertion, and added the comment that the telegram was suppressed by the German Government in order to enable it to accuse England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace. We declare in answer to this that no such telegram is in existence beyond the telegram already made public.

"Prince Lichnowsky sent only the following telegrams:

(Sent at 1.15 p.m. on August 1st.)

"'Sir E. Grey's private secretary has just been here to inform me that the Minister desires to make me proposals concerning England's neutrality, even in case we have to go to war with France and Russia. I shall see Sir E. Grey this afternoon.'

II.

(Sent at 5.30 on the same afternoon.)

"'Sir E. Grey has just submitted the following declaration, which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet: "The German Government's answer respecting Belgium's neutrality is unusually regrettable, since the neutrality of Belgium is a matter affecting the feelings of this country. If Germany could see her way to give a similar positive answer to that which has been given by France it would contribute greatly to relieve the anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public temper if Belgium's neutrality should be disregarded by one of the belligerents while the other respected it."

"'To my question whether on condition that we respected Belgian neutrality he could give a definite declaration concerning Great Britain's neutrality, the Minister replied that this was not possible, but this question would play a big rôle in the present temper of the people. If we disregarded Belgium's neutrality in a war with France a revulsion of sentiment would certainly set in, which would render it difficult to maintain friendly neutrality. For the present there was no intention of proceeding to hostilities against us. It was desired to avoid this if it were in any way possible. It was, however, difficult to draw the line marking how far we might go, before there would be intervention from here. He (Sir E. Grey) kept adverting to Belgian neutrality, and said this question would play a great rôle. He had considered whether, in case of a Russian war, we and France might not simply remain armed against each other without either one attacking.

"'I asked him whether he was in a position to declare that France would enter into a pact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy France nor acquire portions of her territory, I believed we could enter into such an agreement which would assure us Great Britain's neutrality.

"'The Minister said he would go into the matter. He did not overlook the difficulties of restraining the military element on both sides to inactivity.'

III.

(Sent at 8.30 p.m.)

"'My opinion of early to-day is altered. Since no positive English proposal whatever is at hand, further steps along the lines of my instructions are useless.'"

The Norddeutsche comments: "As will be observed, these telegrams contain no intimation that there had been any misunderstanding, and nothing touching on the English allegations concerning a clearing-up of any alleged misunderstandings."

The above statement, added the Agency, does not meet the specific statement of Sir Edward Grey in the Commons, which was as follows:

It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if the German Government thought such an arrangement possible I was sure we could not secure it. It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently the Ambassador sent for my private secretary, and told him that, as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first telegram has been published; this second telegram does not seem to have been published.

This system of spreading false news was extended to the United States, and its effect there will be duly dealt with in this volume. It should be added here that a German Press Bureau was also set up at The Hague, partly in order to influence the people of Holland, and partly that German-Americans passing through Holland on their way back to America might be suitably informed. One of the special correspondents at The Hague wrote:

The bureau apparently is to be run on a most elaborate scale by very clever men. To counter this the British Consul-General has been issuing bulletins, but for such services the amount of money available in a British department is small, whereas German ventures for supplying "truths" have always limitless resources. To show how dangerous the German Press campaign in Holland already is I may mention that the German Consulate in Rotterdam has posted up throughout the town the audacious statement that "notwithstanding all reports to the contrary, it is hereby officially and openly declared that thousands of dum-dum bullets have been found on the British and French prisoners. The denials of the British Government are in contradiction to the statements of their officers, who have declared upon their word of honour that such ammunition was also issued for their revolvers." It is suggested that the names of the officers should have been demanded, but it is felt that if the British authorities here did so the Germans would not have hesitated to name several distinguished prisoners, and they would have had no chance of refuting the charge until the end of the war.

This alone shows how cleverly Germany seeks to poison the minds especially of Holland and America. The danger will increase when the Press Bureau opens. The Dutch Government, I am assured, has striven and is striving to be absolutely correct in its attitude towards England and Germany.

There may have been cases in which Belgians, driven mad by their sufferings, have been guilty of outrages, but the German charge as a whole is absolutely untrue. On the other hand, the Belgian Government at Antwerp has, I am assured, convincing proof that the German troops have been guilty of every crime and brutality.

Belgians of the highest rank who recently visited The Hague describe the spirit of Antwerp as splendid. The Belgian Prime Minister is proving himself a second Kitchener. He holds undisputed sway, and is absolutely trusted by everyone.

The same correspondent added that it would be impracticable to try to starve Germany out by blockading the Dutch Coast, as hardly any foodstuffs were being sent to Germany through Holland.

The campaign of mendacity organised by Germans in the United States was also carried into Canada. The Montreal Star stated that on August 20th a well-known Montreal lawyer received a letter from a prominent German resident of New York in which was given as an authenticated fact, which the British censors had suppressed, the story of the sinking of seven British Dreadnoughts by German torpedo-boats. A banker was assured by a German acquaintance in New York that Germany had officially announced the destruction of an English seaport—name not given—by bombs from a Zeppelin. Another lawyer was asked confidentially to suggest the best means of getting this "news" from German sources to the Montreal public.

A Montreal citizen sent to the Canadian Gazette the following paragraph from the New Yorker Staats Zeitung, as circulated in Canada:

New York, August 18th.—We have very favourable news from private letters concerning the Zeppelin airships. The question has often been asked: "Where are the Zeppelins, and what are they doing?" The following information received in a private letter speaks for itself:

"Every night the Zeppelin airships go out to the North Sea, and when they return there is an English battleship destroyed. Nineteen English battleships have been destroyed so far."

CHAPTER III

Position of Italy—German Intrigues—the Triple Alliance—Turkey's Activity—Plans for Attacking Egypt—A British Warning.

The war had hardly begun before Italy officially announced her intention of remaining neutral. From German sources rumours were circulated to the effect that dissension had arisen in the Italian Cabinet between Signor Salandra (the Prime Minister) and the Marchese di San Giuliano (the Foreign Minister). These rumours, however, proved to be unfounded, and certainly the Italian Government presented not only a correct attitude but a united front both to the Triple Entente and to her partners in the Triple Alliance. It may be briefly mentioned why Italy, although nominally one of the members of the Triplice—Germany, Austria and Italy—should nevertheless have chosen to remain inactive while her nominal allies were engaged in fighting Servia, Russia, France, England, Belgium, and Montenegro.

After her defeat by Germany in 1870, France found herself for a long time unable to exercise any great influence over European politics. Indeed, the first administrators of the Third Republic were encouraged, or rather compelled, by Bismarck to seek an outlet for their superfluous energies in other parts of the world; and it is from the conclusion of the Franco-German War that we may date the real beginning of the French colonial empire. The remarkable success of the French efforts in Algiers, Tunis, and other parts of Northern and Central Africa aroused the jealousy of the Germans very early in the present century; but two decades previously Italy had become exasperated by the French invasion and absorption of Tunis, which gave to France not merely a very strong position in the Mediterranean but the use of many safe harbours.

Eager to seize the advantage of having a powerful ally in the Mediterranean, Germany and Austria, who had just previously entered into a dual alliance, made overtures to Italy, and the dual became a Triple Alliance in 1883. The measure was merely a political one. It benefited none of the parties to it economically; and Italy, by invading Tripoli in 1911, withdrew from it by that very act. It was, of course, obvious that such a step on the part of Italy rendered her in some measure dependent upon the French goodwill. Apart from this fact, the alliance had never been popular among the Italian people, who had no very great affection for Germans and intensely disliked Austrians. Memories of the Austrian onslaught of 1866 were still very strong when the alliance was formed; and they are almost as strong to-day. There is still a powerful political group in Italy known as the Irredentists; and it may be said that at a time of political crisis, especially when Austria and Germany are involved, the whole nation becomes irredentist. The party takes its name from those fairly considerable sections of what was once Italian territory and where Italian is still spoken, but which are now in the possession of other Powers. These territories, known as Italia Irredenta ("Unredeemed Italy") include the Southern Tyrol (the "Trentino") Görz, Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia; and also the Swiss Canton of Tessin (Ticino), Nice, Corsica and Malta.

The Italian expedition to Tripoli in 1911 caused intense dissatisfaction, which was but ill-concealed, in Germany and Austria. Both the Teutonic countries in the partnership objected to their nominal ally increasing her power in the Mediterranean—Germany because such an action would "lock up" many thousands of Italian troops in Tripoli who might be wanted elsewhere, and Austria because she feared that such a movement might indicate a desire on the part of the Italian people to expand in yet other directions. Although some of the so-called Italia Irredenta is held by England and some by France, the animosity of the Irredentists, as of the Italian nation as a whole, is directed exclusively against Austria, and in recent years cordial relations have sprung up between Italy and France. Between Italy and England, of course, relations have always been friendly, and not least so since the days of Garibaldi. The enthusiastic demonstrations held by the Italians in London and Paris after the declaration of war to show their sympathy with the Allies was a striking manifestation of the trend of Italian feeling generally.

Further, there were at least two other reasons why Italy showed no willingness to help her partners in the war. When the Italian army was taking possession of Tripoli coast line under the protection of the Italian fleet, the Austrian Government, under various pretexts, concentrated large masses of troops in the direction of the Italian frontier. Nothing came of this move, but it caused great resentment in Italy at the time. Again, when the first Balkan War came to an end, an acute European crisis arose over the possession of Albania. In this westernmost possession of Turkey, Austrian and Italian interests predominated, and Russia's attempt to secure a pathway to the sea for Servia were ineffectual. After much argument it was finally resolved that Albania should be proclaimed an independent state, and after a long search a Teutonic nobleman, the Prince of Wied, was found willing to assume the crown.

As is well known, Albania from the very first was in a turbulent condition, and various causes rendered the tenure of the Prince of Wied's kingship highly uncertain. In the first place, the century-old jealousy among the ruling chiefs made it difficult to form a cabinet on the western model; and in the second place the Greeks felt that they had a right to the Epirus—that province of uncertain boundaries lying to the north of Greece and to the south of Albania and inhabited by people of an unmistakable Greek stamp known as the Epirotes. As soon as the independence of Albania was announced, the Epirotes, under one of their best known public men, M. Zographos, rose in revolt, and for several months carried on an intermittent warfare against the newly constituted Albanian Government.

It was openly asserted in the Austrian Press that the Epirotes were being aided by Greece, who wished to recover the province; but there was another group who held that the insurgents were deriving their assistance from Italy, who wished by this means to destroy the authority of the Austrians in the northern part of Albania. Italian interests in Albania, as had always been emphasised, converged on the important harbour known as Vallona Bay, which lies almost directly opposite Brindisi. After the outbreak of the present war, this group strongly urged that Italy was merely holding back for the time being in order that she might at a subsequent date make a raid on this part of Albania and annex the territory she desired. The importance of Vallona Bay will be shown by a glance at the map. Austria's only exit to the open sea lies through the Straits of Otranto, which are about forty-five miles wide at the narrowest points, viz: Otranto on the Italian side and Cape Glossa at the mouth of Vallona Bay on the opposite side. It is obvious that if Italy had both these points strongly fortified, it would be practically impossible for an Austrian fleet to pass through.

Whatever Italy's ultimate designs may be—and they are not clear at the time of writing—the fact remains that down to the middle of September, she had taken no steps in the direction of swerving from the neutrality which she had proclaimed at the beginning of the war.

Throughout August various hints were given as to what Italy might lose by not joining her Allies and what she might gain if she did join them. It soon became evident, however, even to the German Press, that Italy, whatever she did, would certainly not come into the firing line with Germany and Austria; and from about the middle of August onwards the inspired German Press confined itself to expressing the hope that their partner's Government would not at least join the other side. On August 14th, for example, the Vossische Zeitung said: "After several years of alliance the very minimum that Germany can demand from Italy is a neutrality, not half-hearted, but having Germany's real welfare in view." This was the tone adopted by the other semi-official organs of the Government about this time.

This change of tone in the German Press, which at first seemed to take it for granted that Italy would join her Allies enthusiastically, must have been due either to forgetfulness or to an entire misconception of the Italian nation. If, to take an inconceivable hypothesis, the Italian Government had wished to go to war on behalf of Germany against the wishes of the Italian people, and if, further, Italy, like Germany, had been composed of a powerful ruling caste and a well-drilled population, no doubt the Italian army would have invaded France. Unlike Germany, however, Italy is composed of peoples whose nature are of a more independent character, and whose form of government is entirely different.

As soon as war broke out, it was clear that the sympathies of the Italian people were wholly on the side of England, France, and Russia, and that it was the wish of the people, if it became necessary to draw the sword, to wield it in such a way as to recover Italia Irredenta, which happened to be under Austrian rule.

It should be remarked that Italy's obligations under her treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria did not compel her to take part in any war unless the war were a purely defensive one; and the Government at Rome made it clear from the first that it regarded the action of Austria towards Servia, and the action of Germany towards France and Belgium, as aggressive.

In spite of reiterated assurances of neutrality, it was persistently rumoured, particularly in Paris, that Italy would declare war on Austria at almost any moment. Although no general mobilisation order was issued at Rome, it was understood that several classes of reservists had been called up. It was indeed felt that any action which Italy might take ought to be taken soon. Well-known military and naval experts, such as Admiral Mahan, expressed the view that Italy "would do well to make her strength felt early."

On August 29th an incident was reported which seemed to show that the decisive step might come at any time. On the previous day information was received at Malta to the effect that Herr von Bitzow, who had been acting as German Consul at Tripoli, had been carrying on an anti-Italian propaganda among the natives; and it was even alleged that he had issued a secret manifesto urging them to make demonstrations. The Italian Government, with more than its usual promptitude, had the offending Consul arrested and removed to Italy, at the same time lodging a protest with the German Foreign Office. No more was heard of this incident at the time; but, as may easily be imagined if it had occurred at any other juncture it would have brought about an acute crisis within the radius of the Triple Alliance.

How the situation was developed was made clear from a long statement sent to London, by a circuitous route, by the Rome correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, and published on September 5th. He said that the Italian fleet was fully mobilised, and was ready for all eventualities. The battle fleet was concentrated at Taranto, under the able and energetic command of the Duke of the Abruzzi. No decree had been issued for the complete mobilisation of the army; but six classes of reservists had been called out. The calling out of fifteen classes would be tantamount to a general mobilisation. Very careful and very thorough preparations were being made. Troops were being slowly and methodically concentrated on the Austrian frontier. Those stationed on the French frontier, except the ordinary peace garrisons and depôt troops, had already been transferred. Any idea of Italy acting against France was out of the question; but these preparations did not necessarily mean war with Austria.

The Italian Government, clearly enough, was fully alive to the situation. Italy wished to bide her time till the psychological moment arrived. That moment had not yet arrived. In any case, the Government was anxious not to precipitate events until after the Conclave electing the new Pope had finished its labours.

All sailings of the Veloce transatlantic liners were suspended at this time. This was regarded as significant, as transports would not be needed unless Italy were contemplating landing troops either in Albania or on Austrian soil.

The correspondent added:

If Italy goes to war with Austria it will be a popular war. The Government knows well that if Germany and Austria win they will bear as great a grudge against Italy for remaining neutral as they would if she threw in her lot against them. It is most important, therefore, that Italy should see to it that Germany and Austria do not win. If, on the other hand, the Triple Entente and their allies win, all Italy can hope for on the conclusion of hostilities is the cession of Trent and the protectorate of Central Albania, with Valona as a reward for her neutrality. Whereas if Italy threw in her lot against Germany and Austria she could hope to recover Trieste and to establish a sound military reputation into the bargain. Moreover, if Italy remains neutral she is likely to experience before long grave economic and social unrest. Italy is very hardly hit by the war. There is a great deal of unemployment. All this would be forgotten if she went to war; and although the problems would recur after the peace, there is much to be said for putting off the evil hour till after the new settlement.

All these facts point to the conclusion that Italy will eventually go to war with Austria. But the moment has not arrived yet. She will have no difficulty in finding a pretext. She may find one in Albania, or in the treatment of Italians in Trieste. The Government may plead the irresistible pressure of public opinion. There is no need for Italy to feel any shame at turning against her old allies, as there is no disguising the fact that she had remained a member of the Triple Alliance for purely time-serving purposes. When she does act, she will act with vigour.

The Marchese di San Giuliano has been for some time in very poor health. He is better again now, and is back in Rome. Among a certain section of the public and of the Press he has been called upon to resign. A more decisive and clearer policy is demanded. But, as a matter of fact, he is likely to remain at his post, as it is felt that there is no man able to fill it of his experience and capacity. The country as a whole has confidence in him. The same may be said of the Prime Minister, Signor Salandra. Since he has been at the head of affairs he has made something of a reputation, and he is known to be a sound economist. The financial position of Italy is not rosy, but there is every reason to hope that the critical period through which she is now passing will be successfully negotiated. Her entry into the war would not materially augment her difficulties on this score.

Hardly less important than the German negotiations with Italy—first, with regard to participation, and, secondly, with regard to neutrality—were the German negotiations with Turkey. It will be recalled that Germany has for nearly two generations had considerable interests in the Turkish Army, both in Europe and in Asia; and it was to a German officer, General von der Goltz Pasha, that the Ottoman Army owed such organisation as it had when Turkey was invaded by the troops of the Balkan League in 1912. On the retirement of General von der Goltz, the Turks asked for further military "advice" and assistance from Berlin, and in reply to their request the German Government "lent" them another experienced officer, General Liman von Sanders (whom several North and South American papers confused with General Leman, the defender of Liège). It was commented upon at the time as curious that when General Liman von Sanders took up his appointment a year or so ago, he brought with him 200 German colonels as assistants, whom he placed at the head of Turkish regiments, together with several officers of lesser rank. The Turkish Army thus became, for all practical purposes, a German war machine, led by Germans, officered by Germans, supplied with German rifles, ammunition and artillery, and liable to march when the word of command was given to the Turkish Government by a German diplomatist.

Europe was astonished to learn early in August that Turkey had decided to mobilise. As the result of an energetic protest by the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople, it was explained that the measure was purely precautionary, and that the Porte did not intend to take any active steps. There the matter was left for a day or two, when the incident of the Goeben and Breslau occurred. The former was one of Germany's largest cruisers, and the latter a smaller one of less importance. Both these vessels, in company with a third, had spent a few days after the opening of the war in bombarding undefended towns in Algiers and Tunis. A combined French and English squadron gave chase, and the result was that a German cruiser was sunk. In spite of the efforts of the pursuers, the Goeben and the Breslau escaped, first of all to Italian waters, and then after a short pause to the Dardanelles.

As Turkey was a neutral country, international law required that the two cruisers should be either dismantled or sent away. Neither of these courses was adopted. Instead it was announced that the Turkish Government had decided to buy the Goeben—the Breslau was not mentioned, but was presumed to be included in the purchase—in view of the fact that two battleships which had been in process of completion for Turkey in British dockyards, had been seized by our Admiralty for possible use against Germany. Turkey complained that this would alter the balance of naval power as between herself and Greece, to the advantage of the latter.

Even legal experts were at variance as to whether Turkey was justified as a neutral country in purchasing the warships of a belligerent. Politically speaking, this was a matter of small consequence. Diplomatists, knowing the close relations existing between Turkey and Germany, were inclined rather to ask whether this alleged purchase was not merely an excuse for assuring the safety of an expensive warship, which would certainly have been sunk either by a French or by a British squadron on emerging from the Dardanelles. Up to the time of going to press that question has not been satisfactorily answered.

The Constantinople Correspondent of The Daily Telegraph reported that just before he left Constantinople on August 4th, the Germans there spread all kinds of wild rumours which were given the imprint of their Embassy—such, for example, as that M. Poincaré had been assassinated, that civil war had broken out in France, that the Germans had entered Belgium triumphantly, and that their arrival in Paris was imminent. Moreover, the German and Austrian diplomatists told Turkey confidently that the German and Austrian armies would very soon be both in Paris and Warsaw. They held out to the Turks various alluring propositions, such as the suppression of the capitulations, the crushing of the Russian "Colossus," and so on, in order to induce the Turks not to proclaim their neutrality, but rather to adopt a hostile attitude towards Russia and consequently to the Triple Entente. In face of the superhuman efforts made by the German and Austrian agents the diplomacy of the Triple Entente remained inactive.

The German military mission under General Liman von Sanders, on its side, commenced an agitation parallel with that of Austro-German diplomacy among the Turkish officers, most of whom had received their training and education in Germany. However, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha, but not Enver Pasha, struggled to secure in the Council of Ministers the triumph of the policy of strictest neutrality, persuaded that for Turkey it was preferable to maintain an attitude of prudent expectation and not to enter into any engagement. Experience had shown them that their Balkan enemies, for the moment divided among themselves, would probably end by reconstituting their alliance and falling on the Turks, and agreeing among themselves as to the partition of Turkey in Europe. These considerations prevailed, and the Ottoman Government proclaimed strict neutrality, while taking all military and naval precautions which events dictated. This was solemnly declared by Talaat Bey and Djavid Bey in Parliament on Sunday, August 2nd.

By August 31st, however, the situation had again become grave. It was stated that Turkey might declare war at any moment—it was only a matter of a few days, and it might be less. All the efforts of the Powers of the Triple Entente had failed, and the situation at the Turkish Embassy in London was admitted to be extremely grave. The arrival of the Panther at Smyrna was thought to be the concluding incident in Turkey's preparations, as it was understood that the vessel, like the Goeben and Breslau, was to be bought by Turkey.

The military party at Constantinople, headed by Enver Pasha, was now practically dominant, and it was declared that if the Grand Vizier raised objections he would be replaced. This party had come to the conclusion, in which it was carefully supported by Germany, that the time was ripe for throwing its full fighting force into the balance and securing the restoration of Macedonia—at any rate of the whole Salonika district, as well as the islands which were conquered by Greece in the war.

German officers and men in large numbers were now pouring into Constantinople to help the Turkish army and navy in the coming campaign. Germany was practically taking over the control of the fleet as well as of the army, and it was thought that Turkey would thus be able to meet the Greek navy on the open sea. Turkey, too, apparently counted on the fact that if she declared war the Balkan States would quarrel among themselves. On the contrary, it was held in Triple Entente circles that the Balkan Alliance against her, which had been so successful in the first war, would be once again called into existence.

Moreover, the intervention of Turkey into the sphere of hostilities, although nominally directed against Greece only, would have been regarded as a declaration of war by the Powers of the Triple Entente. They would have lent the Balkan Powers the support of their fleets in the Mediterranean, in which case they would soon have disposed of all the Turkish and German ships.

The British Government was fully aware, as were all the other Allies, of the gravity of the situation, and of the fact that attempts would be made to create trouble in Egypt, in India, and elsewhere. They warned Turkey that in starting on any such campaign she would be signing her own death-warrant.

The suggestion that an attempt would be made to stir up an insurrection in Egypt was certainly plausible, though it may be pointed out that the German diplomatists at the same time made another suggestion which, if carried out, would have been equally effective or ineffective. Although England is practically mistress of Egypt, Egypt is nevertheless in all strictness not British territory, but Turkish territory, administered by British officials. It might, therefore, have been argued with some show of reasonableness that any movement of troops against Egypt on the part of Turkey could not be construed by us in an unfriendly sense, as Turkey would, after all, merely be moving troops from one part of her own territories to another.

The second German suggestion was that the Turkish Army Corps at Bagdad might be moved towards the Persian Gulf with the object of quelling the risings in the neighbourhood of Koweit, which is in an almost perpetual state of unrest. It happens that the Persian Gulf has always admittedly been an English sphere of influence, and that the small Province of Koweit, governed by a Sheik, was not unconnected with the proposed termination of the Bagdad Railway. The status of the Sheik of Koweit has always been obscure and was supposed to have been "regulated" by the Anglo-Turkish agreement, the details of which were under discussion when war broke out. It might conceivably be urged that here again Turkey could move masses of troops to another part of her own territory and thus strike indirectly on Great Britain.

In reply to these statements and the dishonourable implications which they conveyed, both the Turkish Ambassadors in London and Paris and the Turkish Department for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople gave explicit assurances that Turkey would not take any step inconsistent with her neutrality. It must be remembered that ever since the revolution in 1908, Turkey had received very little practical assistance from Germany, apart from the tinkering with her army. The best advisory officials and all the money were supplied to the Ottoman Government by France and Great Britain. Further, it was believed that, even in the face of German bribes and threats, Turkey would hold back if only out of regard for the stability of her rather precarious empire of Thrace in Asia Minor. In view of a possible Turkish participation in the war, Russia had taken the precautionary measure of massing, it was said, more than half a million troops on the Turkish frontier; and if the Turks had intervened on behalf of Germany, it was believed that Roumania and Greece would take the field on behalf of England, France, and Russia. The position of Bulgaria was fully realised to be more doubtful, as out of all the countries constituting the Balkan League, Bulgaria had profited least as the result of the campaign in 1912-13; and she had vainly appealed for some kind of "compensation" to both groups of the Great Powers.

On September 4th, Roumania, it was announced for the first time, had joined the Great Powers in warning Turkey that a breach of her neutrality would be fraught with disastrous consequences to the Ottoman Empire. In view of the questions at issue between Turkey and Greece, delegates met at the Roumanian capital, Bucharest, to discuss matters. On September 6th, however, the Ambassadors representing France, England, and Russia at Constantinople deemed it advisable once more to warn the Austrian Government, and it was stated that many European families in Constantinople were beginning to leave the city, as it seemed probable that war was about to be declared. It was clear from the diplomatic intelligence which came through that the Turkish Government had itself decided for neutrality, but was being swayed in its decision by the German Ambassador at Constantinople, Baron von Wanggenheim.

It need hardly be added that during this period of grave tension, German Press agents were busy in the Balkans generally. Extraordinary reports were sent to the newspapers in Athens, Sofia, and Bucharest, with the customary object of showing that Germany was winning in every direction and would eventually be the strongest Power in Europe. The German Minister in Athens declared at the end of August that no German port had been blockaded by the British Fleet, and that the North Sea was still open for German commerce.

CHAPTER IV

Polish Independence—The Tsar's Rescript—Japanese Action—Germany in the Far East—Samoa and Togoland.

If German diplomacy had been at work, assuredly diplomatists on the other side had not been idle. One of the most dramatic announcements in connection with the war was that contained in the Tsar's rescript undertaking that, in the event of a Russian victory, the remains of the Kingdom of Poland, which had been divided among Germany, Austria, and Russia, would be united under the kingship of the Tsar.

"Poles!" said the rescript. "The hour has struck in which the fervent dream of your fathers and forefathers can be realised.

"A century and a half ago the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but her soul has not perished. It lives on in the hope that the hour of the renaissance of the Polish nation, of its fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia, will come.

"Russian troops bring you the glad tidings of this reconciliation.

"May the frontiers be obliterated which split up the Polish nation. May it unite itself under the sceptre of the Russian Tsars.

"Under this sceptre Poland will be born anew, free in her faith, her speech, and her self-government.

"One thing only Russia expects from you—like regard for the rights of the nationalities with which history has connected you.

"With open heart, with outstretched, brotherly hand, Great Russia approaches you. She believes that the sword which overthrew the enemy at Gruenwald has not rusted.

"From the shores of the Pacific to the northern seas the Russian war forces are moving forward.

"The dawn of a new life is opening upon you. May the Sign of the Cross shine forth from this dawning symbol of sufferings and resurrection of nations."

The Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievitch, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Forces, also issued an order making it known to the active army and the whole population of the Empire that Russia was waging war in consequence of the challenge thrown down by the common enemy of all Slavs.

The order proceeds:

"The Poles in Russia and those of Germany and Austria who show their loyalty to the Slav cause will have the special protection of the Russian Army and Government in so far as their personal and material security is concerned.

"Any attempt to interfere with the personal rights of Poles who have not been guilty of acts hostile to Russia will be punished with all the severity of martial law."

The moment was ripe for the issue of such a proclamation, for it naturally tended to unite the Poles on the side of Russia. It was not, however, a proclamation drawn up on the spur of the moment and published in August for the sake of its immediate effect. As soon as the news was known in Paris, M. Gabriel Hanotaux, writing in the Figaro, made a remarkable announcement in connection with the Tsar's rescript granting self-government to all three Polands. M. Hanotaux revealed the fact that the Tsar himself, as long ago as eighteen years, then a young Sovereign, confided to him his dream of reviving Poland.

"In this memorable interview, of which I took down every detail, he himself broached the painful subject, and said, 'I know what my duties are towards our Slav brethren of Poland.' For eighteen years I did not breathe a word of this interview, but I can speak now. Since then I followed the gradual and wise demonstrations of the Imperial will. At various intervals pacifying measures, too often hampered by the bureaucracy and by certain parties at Court, proved that the Emperor had not lost sight of his purpose. When lately, against the wish of the Council of the Empire, he promulgated proprio motu an ukase announcing that his Imperial Majesty wished Poland to preserve the official use of her tongue and the right to direct recourse to the supreme authority, I felt that the moment of realization was at hand."

On the same subject, Mr. Sidney Whitman, another well-known authority, writing to the Pall Mall Gazette (August 21st), said:

Sir.—It may not be known to the generality of your readers that the Tsar's intention to resuscitate the kingdom of Poland—at least as far as regards Russian Poland—is by no means a new project. It was already entertained by the Emperor Alexander I., but came to nothing. It is matter of common knowledge that Polish autonomy was one of the items in the programme of the Zemstow Congress in Moscow in 1905 and was unanimously supported by the Polish delegates. Of less common knowledge, however, is the fact that some of the most distinguished of the Russian delegates were also in favour of it. When I was in that city in November, 1905, as special correspondent of the New York Herald, I had occasion to discuss this question with Prince Eugene Troubetzkoi, Alexander Gutschkoff, and Prince Paul Dolgoroukow, the Marshal of the Moscow nobility.

Prince Troubetzkoi's words to me were as follows:

"In my opinion, Poland must receive a form of self-government, the exact nature of which, however, in view of the peculiar conditions which exist through the close proximity of Austrian and Prussian Poland, can only be the subject of careful consideration. The question has been discussed from two different points of view by the members of the Zemstow Congress; they are unanimous, however, with regard to one point, which is that no rupture or break in the unity of the Russian Empire shall take place."

During a stay in Warsaw a few days previously I found, much to my surprise, that the antagonism of the educated Poles towards the Russian régime was much less marked than towards Prussia and even towards Austria, where, as everybody knows, the Galician Poles are more liberally treated than either in Russia or Prussia. I also found unanimity among the same class of people with regard to the view that for economical reasons alone Poland could not afford to be cut off from the Russian Empire, in which the Poles find the best market for their industry, which has made great strides in the course of the present generation. Another consideration in favour of Poland retaining its connection with Russia is that the Russian Empire opens up a wide field for good careers to the more intelligent of the Poles in nearly every sphere of life.

These features seem to speak in favour of the ultimate realization of the Tsar's project in face of victory in the present war.

This rescript regarding Poland, of course, was different from the Tsar's Imperial manifesto to the Russian people, which met with such an enthusiastic response. This manifesto was issued on Sunday, August 2nd, to justify Russia's armed opposition to Germany, and it said:

By the grace of God, we, Nicholas II., Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., to all our faithful subjects make known that Russia, related by faith and blood to the Slav peoples and faithful to her historical traditions, has never regarded their fates with indifference. The fraternal sentiments of the Russian people for the Slavs has been awakened with perfect unanimity and extraordinary force these last few days, when Austria-Hungary knowingly addressed to Servia claims inacceptable for an independent State.

Having paid no attention to the pacific and conciliatory reply of the Servian Government, and having rejected the benevolent intervention of Russia, Austria made haste to proceed to an armed attack and began to bombard Belgrade, an open place. Forced by the situation thus created to take the necessary measures of precaution, we ordered the Army and Navy to be put on a war footing, while using every endeavour to obtain a peaceful solution of the pourparlers begun, for the blood and property of our subjects are dear to us.

Amid friendly relations with Germany and her ally Austria, contrary to our hopes in our good neighbourly relations of long date and disregarding our assurances that the measures taken were in pursuance of no object hostile to her, Germany began to demand their immediate cessation. Having been rebuffed in this demand, she suddenly declared war on Russia. To-day it is not only the protection of the country related to us and unjustly attacked that must be carried out, but we must also safeguard the honour, dignity, and integrity of Russia and her position among the Great Powers.

While these diplomatic steps were being taken in the West, our Allies in the Far East were not idle. Before, however, reference is made to the action taken by Japan at an early stage in the war, a brief account may be given of Germany's varied interests and scattered possessions in the Far East.

Early in November, 1897, two missionaries from the Fatherland were waylaid and killed by professional robbers in a remote part of the Province of Shantung. It was a regrettable incident, for which China, in the ordinary way, would have made any amends in her power, but it offered Germany an opportunity she had long desired of acquiring a naval base on easy terms on the Yellow Sea.

A few days after the murder of the missionaries, the Kaiser's Pacific Squadron anchored in Kiao-Chau, an ultimatum being sent to the Chinese general to leave with his troops within three hours. He did so under protest; the German flag was hoisted, and after negotiations with Pekin the matter was settled in March, 1898, by the leasing of the bay and adjacent territory to the Emperor for ninety-nine years, a period which everyone at the time concluded would be indefinitely extended. It was this lease, obtained in so flagrant a way, which Japan was so soon to tear up.

Facing the Yellow Sea, about 350 miles in a direct line south-east of Pekin, and almost opposite the southern extremity of Korea, the bay of Kiao-Chau is less than two miles wide at its entrance. Within it extends over an area of something like 150 square miles of deep water, affording at all times a safe anchorage for ships of any size. The German naval base of Tsing-Tau stands on the north-east shore, at the outlet of the bay, which is entirely surrounded by hills from 400ft. to 600ft. high, most of them offering admirable sites for fortifications.

If the defensive works, planned when the place was seized, have been carried out and fully armed, the harbour must present formidable obstacles to a sea attack, while the land approaches are guarded by a series of fortifications across the head of the peninsula. The garrison consists of 5,000 German marines and a small force of Chinese soldiers, the remainder of the white population being very inconsiderable.

Described as the key to Northern China, Kiao-Chau, besides its value as a harbour of refuge for warships, is of considerable commercial importance. The district inland under German authority abounds in mineral and metalliferous wealth, an abundant supply of good coal being not the least of its riches. The local native industries are chiefly connected with fruits and vegetables, silk culture, brewing, and soap-making. Two years ago the imports amounted in value to £5,746,900 and the exports to £4,014,750. In the winter months the harbour is the natural outlet for the trade of Northern China, a railway 272 miles long, from Tsing-Tau to Poshan, having much increased its value in this direction.

Besides Tsing-Tau, Germany owns many scattered possessions in the Pacific, all of which it may be thought desirable to take charge of, if not by reason of their actual worth, yet to prevent their use as wireless stations or hiding-places for commerce-destroying cruisers.

One of the most important Teutonic properties in the Southern Pacific stretches along the northern coast of eastern New Guinea. When it was taken over by the Berlin Government in 1884, it received the name of Kaiser Wilhelm Land, its new owners entertaining high expectations as to its future, though the Australians greatly disliked the establishment of a German colony so close to their shores. The territory shares the fertility of all other Pacific regions. The cultivated area is probably about 50,000 acres, and susceptible of almost indefinite extension.

Coco, sago, and other palms are largely grown; ebony wood and bamboo is exported in large quantities, as well as copra and mother-of-pearl shells, which the natives collect for exchange against European goods. The hills are densely wooded with tropical vegetation, but in the clearings a good many cattle and goats are kept. With Long and Dampier Islands, German New Guinea is 70,000 square miles in extent, and has a population of 530,000 natives, besides 700 whites, of whom 90 per cent. come from the Fatherland.

In the same year that Germany absorbed the above-mentioned colony at the back-door of the Australian continent, she also took over the closely adjoining Bismarck Archipelago, containing 20,000 square miles. Here again the soil is fertile from the seashore up to the mountain ranges, where gold in paying quantities has been found. The islands, which are of very varied sizes, export cotton, coffee, copra, and rubber, the latter chiefly grown by a white population numbering under 500. The natives, with a considerable intermixture of Chinese, number 188,000. The seat of the Government, both for the Archipelago and Kaiser Wilhelm Land, is Herbertshöhe, in the main island.

Still further to the south-east a part of the Solomon group is under the Teutonic flag, including the considerable islands of Bougainville and Buka, both doing a large trade in sandal wood, tortoiseshell, and other tropical products. The Caroline, Ladrone, and Pelew Islands, in all 160 square miles, and the Marshall Islands, 160 square miles in extent, all form part of the German New Guinea Protectorate. Amongst the largest of these is Babelthuap, the remainder ranging downwards in size to uninhabited coral or volcanic rocks scattered about the waste of Pacific waters. Their total white population is not more than 1,500.

In the Samoan group Germany was, until early in September, a neighbour of the United States, her possessions here including Savaii and Upolu. She obtained them in November, 1899. The former has an area of 660 and the latter of 340 square miles, the native inhabitants being respectively 12,800 and 20,600, the Europeans numbering about 500. All the islands are extremely productive, copra and cocoa beans being chief articles of export, while a considerable trade in rubber has lately arisen. Wireless stations exist at Apia, the capital, as at Nauru, in the Marshall Islands.

Some time after the outbreak of war an expedition was sent against Samoa from New Zealand, and on Thursday, September 3rd, a message reached the Governor at Wellington to the effect that the German Governor of Samoa had surrendered, and had been sent with other prisoners to Fiji. The landing of troops was carried out with great expedition, and the Union Jack was hoisted at half-past twelve on the afternoon of August 29th.

In the middle of August it was thought desirable that Japan should move, and the decision to this effect was announced on the evening of August 17th in the following statement by the Press Bureau:

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in communication with each other, are of opinion that it is necessary for each to take action to protect the general interests in the Far East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping especially in view the independence and integrity of China, as provided for in that agreement.

It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, or to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the continent of Eastern Asia.

Two days before this the following ultimatum was delivered by Japan to Germany, through the medium of the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin:

We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in the Far East, and to safeguard general interests as contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain.

In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

(1) Withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German men-o'-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-Chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of its not receiving, by noon on August 23rd, an answer from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation.

Some anxiety was felt lest this step should not meet with approval in the United States, in view of the anti-Japanese feeling there; but following a conference between President Wilson and Mr. Bryan, President Wilson said to newspaper men that the Government had assurances from Japan that the latter would preserve the territorial integrity of China in the event of Germany forcing war on Japan by rejecting the Japanese ultimatum. The President said no reason was apparent for the belief that Japan would try to draw the United States into the conflict, and that America would preserve its neutrality; but, at the same time, would insist that Japan should do everything to preserve the integrity of China. The action of Japan created no surprise in Washington, as it had been expected.

No reply was given by the German Government, and in consequence the Japanese proceeded to invest Kaio-Chau. Within a couple of weeks they had occupied seven small islands in the neighbourhood of the German concession, and had removed over 1,000 mines from the adjacent waters. The case for Japan was stated explicitly at a special session of the Japanese Diet which began on Saturday, September 5th. A full account of the proceedings is contained in the following Reuter's telegram from Tokyo:

Count Okuma, the Premier, said he believed that the reasons leading to the convoking of a special session would be thoroughly understood. He asked for the support of Parliament, and said the army and navy were doing their full duty. He asked the Diet to pass the extraordinary Budget framed in connection with the war.

Baron Kato, in his speech, reviewed the events leading up to the war between Japan and Germany, and the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Austria. He first outlined the situation in Europe, showing that force of circumstances had decided Great Britain to participate in the war. Continuing, he said, "Early in August the British Government asked the Imperial Government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. German men-of-war and armed vessels were prowling around the seas of Eastern Asia, menacing our commerce and that of our ally, while Kiao-Chau was carrying out operations apparently for the purpose of constituting a base for warlike operations in Eastern Asia. Grave anxiety was thus felt for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

"As all are aware," he added, "the agreement and alliance between Japan and Great Britain has for its object the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in Eastern Asia and the maintenance of the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of equal opportunities for commerce and industry for all nations in that country, and the maintenance and defence respectively of territorial rights and special interests of contracting parties in Eastern Asia. Therefore, inasmuch as we were asked by our ally for assistance at a time when commerce in Eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike as one of their special interests, is subjected to a constant menace, Japan, who regards that alliance as a guiding principle of her foreign policy, could not but comply to the request to do her part."

"Germany's possession of a base for powerful activities in one corner of the Far East," the Minister added, "was not only a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent peace but also threatened the immediate interests of the Japanese Empire." "The Japanese Government," Baron Kato continued, "therefore resolved to comply with the British request and if necessary to open hostilities against Germany. After the Imperial sanction had been obtained I communicated this resolution to the British Government and a full and frank exchange of views between the two Governments followed and it was finally agreed between them to take such measures as were necessary to protect the general interests contemplated in the agreement and the alliance. Japan had no desire or inclination to become involved in the present conflict, only she believed she owed it to herself to be faithful to the alliance and to strengthen its foundation by insuring permanent peace in the East and protecting the special interests of the two allied Powers."

"Desiring, however, to solve the situation by pacific means the Imperial Government on August 15th gave the following advice to the German Government. (Here the Minister quoted the text of the Japanese ultimatum.) Until the last moment of the time allowed, namely, until August 23rd, the Imperial Government received no answer and in consequence the Imperial rescript declaring war was issued the next day."

Baron Kato briefly referred to Austria-Hungary, with whom, as she had only the most limited interests in the Far East, Japan desired to maintain peaceful relations as long as possible. At the same time it appeared that Austria-Hungary also desired to avoid complications. "In fact, as soon as Japan and Germany entered into a state of war," the Foreign Minister went on to say, "Austria-Hungary asked for the consent and good offices of the Imperial Government to permit the Kaiserin Elizabeth, the only Austrian man-of-war in the Far East likely to force a state of war, to go to Shanghai and there to disarm. I was about to communicate to the Austrian Ambassador the fact that Great Britain and Japan did not entertain any objections to the disarming of the Kaiserin Elizabeth, when suddenly on August 27th the Austrian Ambassador informed me that in consideration of Japan's action against Germany his Government instructed him to leave his post, and diplomatic relations were broken off."

In conclusion Baron Kato said, "When the relations of Japan and Germany reached the point of rupture the Imperial Government asked the American Government if in case of need it would be good enough to undertake the protection of Japanese subjects and interests in Germany. This request the American Government promptly complied with and subsequently upon the rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary the Imperial Government again appealed for American protection for Japanese subjects and interests in Austria-Hungary, when the American Government gave the same willing consent. I desire to avail myself of this opportunity to give expression to the sincere appreciation of the Imperial Government of the courtesy so kindly extended by the American Government."

Finally Baron Kato concluded by saying, "While regretting that Japan has been compelled to take up arms against Germany, I am happy to believe that the army and navy of our illustrious sovereign will not fail to show the same loyalty and valour which distinguished them in the past, so that all may be blessed by early restoration of peace."

That the war was being carried a stage further was seen from the following announcement, made by the Press Bureau on August 26th:

The Secretary of State for the Colonies learns from Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel Bryant, our officer commanding in German Togoland, that the German wireless telegraph installation at Kamina has been destroyed by enemy, and that they sent this (Wednesday) afternoon a flag of truce, offering, if given all the honours of war, to capitulate, and stipulating for specific terms. He replied that they were not in a position to ask for terms, and that they must surrender unconditionally. He told them that we always respected private property, and that there would be as little interference as possible with the trade of the country and the private interests of firms.

He has advanced, and has occupied the crossing at River Amu. The German answer is expected to-night or early to-morrow morning.

[Later]

In continuation of the statement issued to-day from the Colonial Office, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announces that he has received information from the officer commanding the troops in Togoland that Togoland has surrendered unconditionally, and that the Allied Forces will enter Kamina at eight a.m. to-morrow (Thursday) morning.

It was officially stated that the British Force engaged consisted of a detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier Force, under the command of Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel F.C. Bryant, R.A.

The destruction of the German wireless station in Togoland practically isolated German South-West Africa from Germany. This station in Togoland was built at Kamina, 1913-14, and was designed to act as a halfway station for the big station at Windhoek, the capital of German South-West Africa. The latter station—the station at Daressalam also having been destroyed—could now only "speak" to Nauen to take orders from Berlin when the conditions are extremely favourable, as, notwithstanding the great altitude on which the Windhoek station is built, direct communication with Germany was not possible, the stations being equipped on the telephone system, more than one day in ten, and then only for a few "spasmodic" minutes per day.

CHAPTER V

French Government leaves Paris—Triple Entente Declaration—An Important French Protest to the Powers—Aid from Dominions and India—South Africa's Expedition—The King's Proclamations.

Towards the end of August, although the long line of the Allied Forces remained unbroken, the commanders had thought it advisable to fall back in the direction of Paris, so that the left wing of the allied troops could rest on Paris, and their right wing on the great fortress of Verdun. Paris, being itself a strongly fortified town, formed an admirable western base for the operations of the defending armies.

It was not, of course, expected that the invaders would succeed in entering Paris, as the capital could be defended not merely by its own strong ring of fortresses, but by the left wing of the army. If, however, as was certainly expected, battles were to wage round the capital, the work of the Government would have become impossible and difficulties might be experienced by the Cabinet in keeping itself in communication with the commander-in-chief. It was therefore decided that the capital should be removed to some other city, just as the Belgian capital had been transferred from Brussels to Antwerp. Tours was at first spoken of as the new seat of government, but the final choice rested on Bordeaux, a well-situated seaport and a city of really excellent communications to all parts of the country. Early in September, therefore, it was decided that the transfer should take place, and on September 3rd the President of the Republic and all his Ministers addressed the following Proclamation to the country:

People of France

For several weeks sanguinary combats have taken place between our heroic troops and the enemy's army. The bravery of our soldiers has gained for them at several points marked success, but to the north the pressure of the German forces has compelled us to retire.

This situation imposes upon the President of the Republic and the Government the painful decision that in order to watch over the national safety the duty of the authorities is to leave Paris. Under the command of an eminent leader a French army full of courage and energy will defend the capital and the patriotic population against the invader, but the war must be continued at the same time on the rest of the territory without peace or truce, without stay or weakness. The sacred struggle for the honour of the nation and reparation for violated right will continue.

None of our armies has been broken. If some have sustained too perceptible losses the gaps will be immediately filled from the depôts, and the call for recruits assures us for the morrow new resources in men and energy to endure and to fight.

That must be the watchword of the Allied British, Russian, Belgian, and French Armies—to endure and to fight, whilst on the sea the British aid us to cut the communications of our enemies with the world, to endure and to fight, whilst the Russians continue to advance to deal a decisive blow at the heart of the German Empire.

To the Government of the Republic belongs the duty of directing this stubborn resistance everywhere for French independence. To give this formidable struggle all its ardour and all its efficacy it is indispensable that the Government should remain free to act on the demand of the military authorities. The Government is removing its residence to a point where it can remain in constant relations with the whole of the country. It requests Members of Parliament not to hold aloof, in order to form before the enemy a united alliance.

The National Government does not leave Paris without having assured the defence of the city and the entrenched camp by all the means in its power. The Government knows there is no need to advise the Parisian population to calmness, resolution and coolness.

Frenchmen, be worthy in these tragic circumstances! We shall obtain a final victory; we shall obtain it by untiring will, by endurance and tenacity.

A nation which does not desire to perish and which, wishing to live, recoils neither before sufferings nor sacrifices is certain to conquer.

Two days afterwards an important declaration, signed by the representatives of England, Russia and France, was issued in London and in the other capitals. By this declaration the Governments concerned agreed not to conclude peace separately during the war. The following is the text of the declaration as issued by the Press Bureau on the afternoon of September 5th:

Declaration

The undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, hereby declare as follows:

The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the Allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies. In faith whereof, the undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in London in triplicate this 5th day of September, 1914.

(L.S.) E. GREY

(His Britannic Majesty's Secretary
of State for Foreign
Affairs).

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON

(Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the French
Republic).

(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF

(Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty
the Emperor of Russia).

Paris, September 4th.

The adherence of Japan to this declaration was subsequently notified. Belgium could not participate in it for technical reasons, her neutrality being "guaranteed."

On the same day the French Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a strongly-worded communication to the Powers with reference to the German atrocities in Belgium and France. This communication was as follows:

The numerous violations of international law by the Germans have led the Government of the Republic to address to the representatives of the Powers in Paris memoranda which are intended to set forth indisputable facts. These are selected merely as examples, and we could not bring to the notice of the Powers every act contrary to the laws of war of which we receive accounts day by day. This first series of memoranda will suffice to establish the two following classes of facts:

First, the armies and Government of Germany profess the deepest scorn for international law and for treaties solemnly recognised by Germany.

Secondly, the devastations of the invaded countries (incendiarism, murder, pillage, and atrocities) appear to be systematically pursued by order of the leaders, and are not due to acts of indiscipline.

It is necessary to emphasise this two-fold characteristic of the German proceedings. They constitute a negation of every human and international law, and bring back modern warfare, after centuries of civilisation, to the methods of barbarian invasions. We are confident that such facts will arouse the indignation of neutral States, and will help to make clear the meaning of the struggle which we are carrying on for the respect of law and the independence of nations.

To the communiqué were attached ten separate memoranda, setting forth various specific charges against the Germans.

The first memorandum dealt with the dispatch of wounded prisoners and similar atrocities.

A report from the Commander-in-Chief of the eastern armies, dated August 10th, stated that a considerable number of wounded had been finished off by shots fired point-blank into their faces, while others had been deliberately stamped and tramped upon. The Bavarian infantry systematically burned villages through which they had passed, although there had been no artillery fire which could provoke such measures.

The second memorandum detailed the circumstances of the bombardment of Pont-à-Mousson, an unfortified place, in violation of The Hague Convention, and the use of dum-dum bullets by the Germans was dealt with in the third memorandum. On August 10th, after an engagement, a French surgeon found a clip containing five cartridges with cylindro-conical bullets, the noses of which had been filed. Similar bullets were found in the bodies of French soldiers, and were forwarded to the Ministry of War.

In the fifth memorandum the German allegation that the civilian population had taken part in the war was strongly denied, and was declared to be nothing but a pretext put forward to justify the atrocities committed by the German troops and give them the appearance of reprisals. From the beginning of the war the Germans had made a practice of burning undefended villages and of assassinating the inhabitants, and evidence of this was to be found in letters and notebooks taken from Germans, dead or prisoners.

A notebook found on a corpse of a German lieutenant contained the following remark: "We have fired the church of Villerupt and shot the inhabitants. We pretended that scouts had taken refuge in the tower of the church and had fired on us from there. The fact was, it was not the inhabitants of Villerupt, but Customs officers and forest guards who fired on us."

The sixth memorandum gave detailed evidence in support of the charge that a systematic devastation of the country had been ordered by the German leaders. Letters found on German soldiers made it clear that the burning of villages and the shooting of the inhabitants were general measures, and that the orders were given by superior officers.

Attention was called to this violation of The Hague Convention, and it was pointed out that it was on the proposal of the German delegates at the second Hague Conference that an article was inserted declaring that the belligerent guilty of such violation should be liable to pay an indemnity.

In the remaining memoranda information was given as to the destruction of villages in the region of Paris, the murder of Red Cross nurses, and the burning of Affleville, under circumstances of particular brutality.

The statement concluded: "The Government of the Republic, respecting international conventions which it has ratified, protests against those violations of international law, and holds up to reprobation before the opinion of the world the behaviour of an enemy who respects no rule and goes back on his signature affixed to international agreements."

It was observed with immense satisfaction, not merely throughout the British Empire, but by our allies in the field, that Britain in her oversea possessions was quick to come forward with offers of help as soon as the situation on the Continent became known. In Canada, for example, the Government voted large supplies of wheat, cheese and so forth for the troops, and also undertook to raise two contingents, each 20,000 strong, to take part in the campaign. Patriotic funds were started in all the large towns throughout the Dominion, and the women of Canada raised funds for a supplementary naval hospital.

Similar measures were taken by the Australian Government, and both Ministers and ex-Ministers declared that Australia would offer "the vigour of her manhood, the bounty of her soil resources, her economic organisation, all she possesses to the last ear of corn and the last drop of blood." This quotation is taken from a speech by Mr. Millen, the Commonwealth Minister of Defence, speaking at Melbourne on August 23rd. Similar utterances were delivered by his colleagues and by the Parliamentary Opposition. An appeal to Australians to form an Imperial Expeditionary Force resulted in an almost immediate reply from 20,000 volunteers.

Offers of help on a proportionate scale came from New Zealand and South Africa; and the South African Government took steps both to guard the Union from German raids and to co-operate with the Imperial troops in any movement that might be made against the adjacent German colonies. A later and momentous step by the South African Union, taken at the request of the Imperial Government, was notified in the subjoined communications from Reuter's Agency:

Cape Town,
Sept. 9th, 1914.

A special session of Parliament, necessitated by the situation arising from the war, and the mobilisation of the Defence forces, was opened to-day by Lord Buxton.

The Governor-General's first act was to read a personal message from the King, acknowledging the many proofs of loyalty displayed by South Africa in common with the rest of the Empire, and of its determination to play a part in the great conflict forced upon Great Britain. His Majesty relies with confidence upon the people of South Africa to maintain and to add fresh lustre to the splendid traditions of courage, determination, and endurance which they have inherited.

At the evening session of the House of Assembly General Botha moved the following resolution:

This House, fully recognising the obligations of the Union as a portion of the British Empire, respectfully requests the Governor-General to convey a humble address to his Majesty, assuring him of its loyal support in bringing to a successful issue the momentous conflict which has been forced upon him in defence of the principles of liberty and international honour, and of its whole-hearted determination to take all measures necessary for defending the interests of the Union and co-operating with His Majesty's Imperial Government to maintain the security and integrity of the Empire, and further humbly requesting His Majesty to convey to His Majesty the King of the Belgians its admiration for and its sincere sympathy with the Belgian people in their heroic stand for the protection of their country against the unprincipled invasion of its rights.

General Botha, who spoke with deep feeling, was followed with the most earnest attention by a thronged House. The Premier said that never had the Parliament of South Africa assembled at a more critical time. He emphasised that the Imperial Government had informed the Government that certain war operations in German South-West Africa were considered to be of strategic importance. The Imperial Government added that if the Union Government could undertake these operations they would be regarded as of great service to the Empire. The Empire to which South Africa belonged was involved in one of the greatest and cruellest wars which had ever befallen humanity.

General Botha continued: "The Government, after careful consideration, decided to comply with the request in the interests of South Africa as well as of the Empire. There could only be one reply to the Imperial Government's request.

"To forget their loyalty to the Empire in this hour of trial would be scandalous and shameful, and would blacken South Africa in the eyes of the whole world. Of this South Africans were incapable. They had endured some of the greatest sacrifices that could be demanded of a people, but they had always kept before them ideals, founded on Christianity, and never in their darkest days had they sought to gain their ends by treasonable means. The path of treason was an unknown path to Dutch and English alike.

"Their duty and their conscience alike bade them be faithful and true to the Imperial Government in all respects in this hour of darkness and trouble. That was the attitude of the Union Government; that was the attitude of the people of South Africa. The Government had cabled to the Imperial Government at the outbreak of war, offering to undertake the defence of South Africa, thereby releasing the Imperial troops for service elsewhere. This was accepted, and the Union Defence Force was mobilised."

With regard to the operations in South-West Africa, General Botha declared that there could be only one response to the Imperial Government's wishes, unless they wished to contemplate a situation much more serious than that which now confronted them.

He wished them to understand the seriousness of the position, and to accept the responsibility which they would be called upon to accept. He placed himself with confidence in the hands of the House. General Botha detailed the German entry into Union territory at Nakob (Nauby). This force was entrenched in kopjes in Union territory at the present time. He also described an affair at Scuitdrift in August. In addition to this, armed German forces were on the Union frontier in large numbers before there was any question of Union mobilisation.

The Premier said he quoted the foregoing to show the hostile attitude adopted by Germans in the neighbouring territory. He next referred to the White Paper on the diplomatic proceedings on the eve of war. These documents, he declared, showed that if ever Great Britain entered upon a war with clean hands it was this war.

Great confidence had been reposed in the people of South Africa. They had received a Constitution under which they could create a great nationality. Great Britain had given them this Constitution, and ever since had regarded them as a free people and as a sister State. As an example of how the Imperial Government treated them, General Botha said that last July the Union Government wanted to raise a loan of £4,000,000. They had raised only £2,000,000. As things were, it would be fatal to go into the money market just now, so the Imperial Government had now come to the assistance of the Union Government, and had lent the Union £7,000,000. That was the spirit of co-operation and brotherhood which invariably animated the Imperial towards the Union Government.

In his judgment it was the duty of the House to see that every effort was put forth to bring the country successfully and honourably out of this war, and that South Africa issued from it, not as a divided, but as a united, people.

Sir Thomas Smartt, leader of the Opposition, heartily congratulated General Botha on his speech, and assured the Government of the most cordial support of the Opposition.

London,
Sept. 9th.

Reuter's Agency learns from an authoritative source that the line to be followed by the Union Government of South Africa, as outlined in General Botha's speech, has been well known in official circles for some time. From the outset there has been the closest touch between the Imperial and the Union Governments, both as regards the general attitude of the latter and the military requirements in view of the war with Germany. On the outbreak of war a brief but significant telegram was received from General Botha, containing merely the words, "We will do our duty."

What this implies as regards the neighbouring German colony cannot, for obvious reasons, be stated in detail at this stage. It may be declared, however, that the news of the crossing of the Orange River by two German forces spread like wildfire through South Africa and caused a feeling of the greatest indignation, and, without any suggestion from the Imperial Government, steps were at once taken—and have since been completed—for effectually dealing with German South-West Africa.

It was on the initiative of General Botha's Government that, on the outbreak of war with Germany, the Union Government telegraphed to London suggesting that the garrison of Imperial troops should be withdrawn, and offering the whole military resources of South Africa for the defence of the Union, including the native territories.

It had by this time become apparent that this meant not only defence, but also offensive operations against the adjoining German colony of 326,000 square miles in extent, with its garrison and fortifications. What this involved was perfectly well known to the authorities, who were aware of the large quantities of cannon, arms, and ammunition that had been poured into the country in the vain hope that the Boers would join the Germans when trouble arose.

The South African Government does not expect a "walk-over," but it is prepared for all eventualities. It has been a matter of the greatest gratification to the Union Government that, at this juncture, the Imperial Government offered to give South Africa all the financial assistance needed. In this connection it should be explained that all defence measures and warlike operations are being undertaken at the expense of the Union Government. The offer of the Imperial Government, which is of great value in view of the moratorium, is to lend what money may be necessary for the time being for war purposes.

At home, too, by way of showing how united the nation was at this critical time, it should be mentioned that after a two days' conference, the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, issued, on September 3rd, an important manifesto to trade unionists of the country on the war. It stated that the committee was especially gratified at the manner in which the Labour party in the House of Commons had responded to the appeal made to all political parties to give their co-operation in securing the enlistment of men to defend the interests of their country, and heartily endorsed the appointment upon the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee of four members of the party, and the placing of the services of the national agent at the disposal of that committee to assist in carrying through its secretarial work.

The manifesto proceeded:

The Parliamentary Committee are convinced that one important factor in the present European struggle has to be borne in mind, so far as our own country is concerned, namely, that in the event of the voluntary system of military service failing, the country in this its time of need, the demand for a national system of compulsory military service will not only be made with redoubled vigour, but may prove to be so persistent and strong as to become irresistible.

The prospect of having to face conscription, with its permanent and heavy burden upon the financial resources of the country, and its equally burdensome effect upon nearly the whole of its industries, should in itself stimulate the manhood of the nation to come forward in its defence, and thereby demonstrate to the world that a free people can rise to the supreme heights of a great sacrifice without the whip of conscription.

Another factor to be remembered in this crisis of our nation's history, and most important of all so far as trade unionists and Labour in general are concerned, is the fact that upon the result of the struggle in which this country is now engaged rests the preservation and maintenance of free and unfettered democratic government which in its international relationship has in the past been recognised, and must unquestionably in the future prove to be the best guarantee for the preservation of the peace of the world.

The mere contemplation of the overbearing and brutal methods to which people have to submit under a Government controlled by a military autocracy—living, as it were, continuously under the threat and shadow of war—should be sufficient to arouse the enthusiasm of the nation in resisting any attempt to impose similar conditions upon countries at present free from military despotism.

But if men have a duty to perform in the common interest of the State, equally the State owes a duty to those of its citizens who are prepared—and readily prepared—to make sacrifices in its defence and for the maintenance of honour. Citizens called upon voluntarily to leave their employment and their homes for the purpose of undertaking military duties have a right to receive at the hands of the State a reasonable and assured recompense, not so much for themselves as for those who are dependent upon them, and no single member of the community would do otherwise than uphold a Government which in such an important and vital matter took a liberal, and even generous, view of its responsibilities towards those citizens who come forward to assist in the defence of their country.

We respectfully commend this suggestion to the favourable consideration of the Government of the day.

Long life to the free institutions of all democratically-governed countries.

J.A. Seddon, Chairman | W. Mosses
W.J. Davis, Vice-Chairman | J.W. Ogden
A. Evans | A. Smith
H. Gosling | H. Smith
J. Hill | J.B. Williams
J. Jenkins | J.H. Williams
W. Matkin | J. Sexton
C.W. Bowerman, Secretary. |

A manifesto on the same lines was issued by Mr. Ben Tillett, on behalf of the Dockers' Union. Mr. Ben Tillett was usually regarded as being the leader of one of the extreme sections of the Labour movement; but his manifesto, which reads as follows, lacked nothing in patriotism:

Every resource at our command must be utilised for the purpose of preserving our country and nation. Every able-bodied man must either fight, or be ready to defend his country. Every family of those men who go to the front must be guaranteed a competence and food.

We first of all propose that all able-bodied men should shoulder the responsibilities this war imposes; that local units of men having worked and lived together constitute units of a thousand each, for the better purpose of training and preparation. That these units of our members or of trades unionists from a given area be registered.

Kaiserism and militarism should receive its death blow in this Armageddon. Our traditions at least stand for the best, our limitations and inequalities are largely of our own making; and will be so long as the workers are contented slaves, under a vicious wage system.

I want to see our own men drilled daily, even if the War Office cannot help us. There are plenty of open spaces, many of our men are ex-soldiers, they could help in the drilling. Municipal authorities and employers could help. Employed and unemployed could help; the War Office should help those who can enlist, subject to guarantees from the Government, giving protection to the families left behind.

It subsequently appeared that the preliminary steps taken by the South African Government were timely enough. The Daily Telegraph's Johannesburg correspondent, telegraphing on September 1st, said that the authorities had been perturbed by a number of serious reports to the effect that Germans were interfering with the natives, and inciting them to seditious gatherings. This action assumed such a character as to demand instant action. Alleged German missionaries were even sowing the seeds of discontent in the natives' minds against British rule, magnifying the temporary German success in Europe. It was suggested that the Government might turn the searchlight on all German mission stations in British South Africa. Intelligent natives had been informed that the Germans were "coming soon," when the natives would be given big pay, plenty of drink, and no passes would be necessary. They were also advised to go home, the evident purpose being to paralyse the mining industry.

On August 31st the English newspapers contained an important interview given by Mr. Winston Churchill to Mr. Willian G. Shepherd, the representative of the United Press Associations of America. The text of the interview, in Mr. Shepherd's own words, is as follows:

On my asking Mr. Churchill about the cause of the war, he handed me the celebrated White Paper of Sir Edward Grey's negotiations, saying: "There is our case, and all we ask of the American people is that they should study it with severe and impartial attention."

I then asked what was the underlying cause apart from the actual steps which had led to the rupture. He replied in effect that the war was started and was being maintained by the Prussian military aristocracy, which set no limits to its ambition of world-wide predominance. In a word, it is the old struggle of 100 years ago against Napoleon. The grouping of forces is different; the circumstances are different; the occasion is different; the man, above all, is different—happily. But the issue is the same. We are at grips with Prussian militarism. England stands right in the path of this evergrowing power. Our military force is perhaps small, but it is good and it will grow; our naval and financial resources are considerable; and with these we stand between this mighty army and a dominion which would certainly not be content with European limits.

I asked whether the end of the war would see some abatement of the struggle of armaments. Mr. Churchill replied:

That depends on the result. If we succeed, and if, as the result of our victory, Europe is rearranged, as far as possible, with regard to the principle of nationality, and in accordance with the wishes of the people who dwell in the various disputed areas, we may look forward with hope to a great relaxation and easement. But if Germany wins it will not be the victory of the quiet, sober, commercial elements in Germany, nor of the common people of Germany with all their virtues, but the victory of the blood and iron military school, whose doctrines and principles will then have received a supreme and terrible vindication.

"I cannot understand," he continued, "why Germany has not been contented with her wonderful progress since the Battle of Waterloo. For the last half century she has been the centre of Europe; courted by many; feared by many; treated with deference by all. No country has had such a reign of prosperity and splendour, yet all the time she has been discontented; solicitous of admiration; careless of International Law; worshipping force and giving us all to understand that her triumphs in the past and her power in the present were little compared to what she sought in the future.

"And now the great collision has come, and it is well that the democratic nations of the world—the nations, I mean, where the peoples own the Government, and not the Government the people—should realise what is at stake. The French, English, and American systems of government by popular election and parliamentary debate with the kind of civilisation which flows from such institutions are brought into direct conflict with the highly efficient Imperialist bureaucracy and military organisation of Prussia. That is the issue. No partisanship is required to make it plain. No sophistry can obscure it."

I asked whether the democracy of the United States, apart from the moral issues involved, had any direct interests in the result of the war.

"You are the judges of that," replied the First Lord. "You do not require me to talk to you of your interests. If England were to be reduced in this war, or another which would be sure to follow from it if this war were inconclusive, to the position of a small country like Holland, then, however far across the salt water your country may lie, the burden which we are bearing now would fall on to your shoulders.

"I do not mean by that that Germany would attack you, or that if you were attacked you would need to fear the result so far as the United States was concerned. The Monroe Doctrine, however, carries you very far in South as well as North America; and is it likely that victorious German militarism, which would then have shattered France irretrievably, have conquered Belgium, and have broken for ever the power of England, would allow itself to be permanently cut off from all hopes of that oversea expansion and development with which South America alone can supply it?

"Now the impact is on us. Our blood which flows in your veins should lead you to expect that we shall be stubborn enough to bear that impact. But if we go down and are swept in ruin into the past, you are the next in the line.

"This war is for us a war of honour; of respect for obligations into which we have entered; and of loyalty towards friends in desperate need. But now that it has begun it has become a war of self-preservation. The British democracy, with its limited monarchy, its ancient Parliament, its ardent social and philanthropic dreams, is engaged for good or for ill in deadly grapple with the formidable might of Prussian autocratic rule. It is our system of civilisation and government against theirs. It is our life or theirs.

"We are conscious of the greatness of the times. We recognise the consequence and proportion of events. We feel that, however inadequate we may be, however unexpected the ordeal may be, we are under the eye of history, and, the issue being joined, England must go forward to the very end."

While I was speaking to Mr. Churchill a telegram came in from Belgium announcing the total destruction of the town of Louvain as an act of military execution. Handing it to me, he said: "What further proof is needed of the cause at issue? Tell that to your American fellow-countrymen. You know," he added, "I am half American myself."

The most remarkable demonstration of enthusiastic loyalty, however, came from India. It was no surprise to those acquainted with the conditions in our great Asiatic Empire to know that all classes and creeds were united in their devotion to the British Crown; but it was evident from the comments which followed the statements in Parliament on September 9th that the munificent offers made to the Viceroy had astonished the whole world. By the middle of August it was known that many Indian Chiefs had been addressing inquiries to the Viceroy in the spirit of the ruler of the ancient State of Rewa, who wrote: "What orders from His Majesty for me and my troops?"

On September 9th, the Marquis of Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, in the House of Lords, and Mr. Charles Roberts, Under-Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons, read telegrams from the Viceroy summarising the offers of the Indian chiefs. Amid glowing excitement and enthusiasm, the Houses learned that Sir Pertab Singh despite his seventy years "would not be denied his right to serve the King-Emperor," and that he was taking with him among his troops his young nephew, the Maharaja of Cooch Behar, a boy of sixteen. The State of Nepal sent seven battalions of Gurkhas, and there were many other offers of men, money, and jewels. The following long cablegram sent by the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on September 8th describes the offers of service:

Following is a summary of offers of service, money, etc., made in India to the Viceroy. The rulers of the Native States in India, who number nearly 700 in all, have with one accord rallied to the defences of the Empire and offered their personal services and the resources of their States for the war.

From among the many Princes and nobles who have volunteered for active service, the Viceroy has selected the Chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Kishangarh, Rutlam, Sachin, Patiala, Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, the Heir-Apparent of Bhopal and a brother of the Maharaja of Cooch Behar, together with other cadets of noble families. The veteran Sir Pertab would not be denied his right to serve the King-Emperor, in spite of his 70 years, and his nephew, the Maharaja, who is but 16 years old, goes with him.

All these have, with the Commander-in-Chief's approval, already joined the Expeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Gwalior and the Chiefs of Jaora and Dholpur, together with the Heir-Apparent of Palanpur, were, to their great regret, prevented from leaving their States. Twenty-seven of the larger States in India maintain Imperial Service troops, and the services of every corps were immediately placed at the disposal of the Government of India on the outbreak of war.

The Viceroy has accepted from twelve States contingents of cavalry, infantry, sappers, and transport, besides a camel corps from Bikaner, and most of them have already embarked. As particular instances of generosity and eager loyalty of the Chiefs, the following may be quoted: Various Durbars have combined together to provide a hospital ship, to be called "The Loyalty," for the use of the Expeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Mysore has placed Rs.50 lacs at the disposal of the Government of India for expenditure in connection with the Expeditionary Force.

The Chief of Gwalior, in addition to sharing in the expense of the hospital ship, the idea of which was originated with himself and the Begum of Bhopal, has offered to place large sums of money at the disposal of the Government of India and to provide thousands of horses as remounts. From Loharu, in the Punjab, and Las Bela and Kalat, in Baluchistan, come offers of camels with drivers, to be supplied and maintained by the Chiefs and Sardars.

Several Chiefs have offered to raise additional troops for military service should they be required, and donations to the Indian Relief Fund have poured in from all States. The Maharaja of Rewa has offered his troops, his treasury, and even his private jewellery, for the service of the King-Emperor. In addition to contributions to the Indian Fund, some Chiefs, namely, those of Kashmir, Bundi, Orchha, Gwalior and Indore, have also given large sums to the Prince of Wales' Fund.

The Maharaja of Kashmir, not content with subscribing himself to the Indian fund, presided at a meeting of 20,000 people held recently at Srinagar, and delivered a stirring speech, in response to which large subscriptions were collected.

Maharaja Holkar offers, free of charge, all horses in his State army which may be suitable for Government purposes. Horses also offered by Nizam's Government, by Jamnagar and other Bombay States. Every chief in the Bombay Presidency has placed the resources of his State at the disposal of Government, and all have made contributions to the relief fund.

Loyal messages and offers also received from Mehtar of Chitral and tribes of Khyber Agency as well as Khyber Rifles.

Letters have been received from the most remote States in India, all marked by deep sincerity of desire to render some assistance, however humble, to the British Government in its hour of need.

Last, but not least, from beyond the borders of India have been received generous offers of assistance from the Nepal Durbar; the military resources of the State have been placed at the disposal of the British Government, and the Prime Minister has offered a sum of Rs.3 lakhs to the Viceroy for the purchase of machine guns or field equipment for British Gurkha regiments proceeding over-seas, in addition to large donations from his private purse to the Prince of Wales' Fund and the Imperial Indian Relief Fund.

To the 4th Gurkha Rifles, of which the Prime Minister is honorary colonel, the Prime Minister has offered Rs.30,000 for the purchase of machine guns in the event of their going on service.

The Dalai Lama of Tibet has offered 1,000 Tibetan troops for service under the British Government. His Holiness also states that Lamas innumerable throughout the length and breadth of Tibet are offering prayers for success of British Army and for happiness of souls of all victims of war.

The same spirit has prevailed throughout British India. Hundreds of telegrams and letters received by Viceroy expressing loyalty and desire to serve Government, either in the field or by co-operation in India. Many hundreds also received by local administrations. They come from communities and associations, religious, political, and social, of all classes and creeds, also from individuals offering their resources or asking for opportunity to prove loyalty by personal service. Following may be mentioned as typical examples:

The All-India Moslem League, the Bengal Presidency Moslem League, the Moslem Association of Rangoon, the trustees of the Aligarh College, the Behar Provincial Moslem League, the Central National Mohammedan Association of Calcutta, the Khoja Community and other followers of Aga Khan, the Punjab Moslem League, Mohammedans of Eastern Bengal, citizens of Calcutta, Madras, Rangoon, and many other cities, Behar Landholders' Association, Madras Provincial Congress, Taluqoars of Oudh, Punjab Chiefs' Association, United Provinces Provincial Congress, Hindus of the Punjab, Chief Khalsa Diwan representing orthodox Sikhs, Bohra Community of Bombay, Parsee Community of Bombay.

Delhi Medical Association offer field hospital that was sent to Turkey during Balkan War; Bengalee students offer enthusiastic services for an ambulance corps, and there were many other offers of medical aid; Zemindars of Madras have offered 500 horses, and among other practical steps taken to assist Government may be noted the holding of meetings to allay panic, keep down prices, and maintain public confidence and credit. Generous contributions have poured in from all quarters to Imperial Indian Relief Fund.

The Secretary of State for India further announced that, in addition to the offers of service and assistance in connection with the war, which had been made in India to the Viceroy, the following offers had been received from Chiefs and others residing in this country:

Their Highnesses the Maharaja and the Maharani Maji Sahiba of Bharatpur: (1) The whole resources of their State; (2) Two motor-cars and a chauffeur, with all expenses; (3) Rs.2,000 to the Indian Relief Fund.

His Highness the Raja of Akalkot: Personal service in the field.

His Highness the Raja of Pudukota: "All I possess"; expresses his anxiety to serve in any capacity. Has placed his motor-car at the disposal of Government, and is returning to India to raise, subject to approval, a regiment of his subjects to release a Regular regiment.

His Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda: All his troops and resources.

Mir Ghulam Ali Khan of Khairpur: Personal service in the field.

The British Indian residents in this country of every class and creed, added the official statement, had been forward with loyal and generous offers of personal services and help.

At the same time the India Council issued a summary of the proceeding in the Viceroy's Council, from which it was evident that all the members, Hindus and Mohammedans, were eager to emphasise the fact that the various sections of the populace they represented wished to do all in their power to help the Empire at such a critical period. The text of the passage of Lord Hardinge's speech in the Viceroy's Council dealing with the dispatch of troops from India to the seat of war was as follows:

It is no longer a secret that India has already dispatched two splendid divisions of infantry to Europe and one cavalry brigade, while three more cavalry brigades will follow immediately. That we have been in a position to send over 70,000 combatants to fight for the Empire across the seas is a source of pride and satisfaction to India as a whole, and with the knowledge that practically all the ruling chiefs have placed their military forces and the resources of their States at the disposal of the Government, it is clear that we are not at the end of our military resources.

Among the chiefs selected to accompany the expeditionary force are the Maharaja Sir Pertab Singh, the Maharajas of Bikanir, Patiala, Rutlam, Kishengarh, and Jodhpur, the Nawabs of Jaora, Sachin, and Bhopal, and also the Malik Umar Hayat.

Steps were taken to circulate the announcement widely throughout the world; and Lord Lansdowne, in welcoming the offer in the House of Lords, remarked:

Few in this country realise how great a thing it is that these ruling chiefs should come forward in this way to assist us. I wonder how many realise that the Maharaja of Mysore rules over a population which exceeds that of Sweden, that the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior has more subjects than the King of Denmark, that the Nizam of Hyderabad governs a people three times as numerous as the people of Ireland.

It is no small thing that these rulers should have come forward without exception and given practical proof of their desire to help. On behalf of those who sit on this side of the House I congratulate the Marquis of Crewe on the manner in which the India Office has been supported at this critical time, and I congratulate the Viceroy, to whom, at the moment when he must have had many sad preoccupations, the response of the people of India must have brought consolation and encouragement.

Our cordial thanks ought also to be conveyed to the people of India and to the loyal chiefs who have stood by us in so conspicuous a manner.

In response to the offers of help, the King was pleased to issue the following message:

To the Governments and Peoples of My Self-Governing Dominions

During the past few weeks the peoples of My whole Empire at Home and Overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilisation and the peace of mankind.

The calamitous conflict is not of My seeking. My voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which My Empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside when in defiance of pledges to which My Kingdom was a party the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed My honour and given to destruction the liberties of My Empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with Me in this decision.

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of Great Britain and of the Empire.

My peoples in the Self-governing Dominions have shown beyond all doubt that they wholeheartedly endorse the grave decision which it was necessary to take.

My personal knowledge of the loyalty and devotion of My Oversea Dominions had led me to expect that they would cheerfully make the great efforts and bear the great sacrifices which the present conflict entails. The full measure in which they have placed their services and resources at My disposal fills Me with gratitude, and I am proud to be able to show to the world that My Peoples Oversea are as determined as the People of the United Kingdom to prosecute a just cause to a successful end.

The Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Dominion of New Zealand have placed at My disposal their naval forces, which have already rendered good service for the Empire. Strong Expeditionary forces are being prepared in Canada, in Australia, and in New Zealand for service at the Front, and the Union of South Africa has released all British Troops and has undertaken important military responsibilities, the discharge of which will be of the utmost value to the Empire. Newfoundland has doubled the numbers of its branch of the Royal Naval Reserve and is sending a body of men to take part in the operations at the Front. From the Dominion and Provincial Governments of Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies are on their way for the use both of My Naval and Military Forces and for the relief of the distress in the United Kingdom which must inevitably follow in the wake of war. All parts of My Oversea Dominions have thus demonstrated in the most unmistakable manner the fundamental unity of the Empire amidst all its diversity of situation and circumstance.

To the Princes and Peoples of India, the King-Emperor sent a special message. The first two paragraphs were identical in wording with those in the message sent to the Dominions. The message to India then continued:

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of England and of India.

Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of My Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to My Throne expressed both by My Indian subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes and the Ruling Chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched My heart, and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked My Indian subjects and Myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British nation of goodwill and fellowship, which greeted My return in February, 1912, after the solemn ceremony of My Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.

At the very beginning of the struggle, Germany had made a determined effort to win the friendship of the United States. From the great American Republic the great European autocracy wanted three things: moral support, money, and assistance in rescuing the German mercantile marine. German shipping to the amount of hundreds of thousands of tons was imprisoned in American ports; to venture outside would have been to court disaster from the strong squadrons of the British and French cruisers in the Atlantic. It was therefore suggested by the numerous Germans in New York and Washington, and by Germans who had become naturalised Americans, that with a view to the restoration of American shipping it would be a good plan to purchase from Germany the numerous German liners lying idle in American waters. The scheme did not make sufficient progress for any definite amount of money to be mentioned; but it was stated that the value of the steamers was estimated at £20,000,000—a sum which would have been very useful to Germany in carrying on the campaign.

Acting under instructions from their Governments, protests were lodged at Washington by the British and French Embassies against this proposed transfer of German merchant shipping to a neutral flag. Legally the transfer would have been objectionable; and in any case the scheme was supported in America almost entirely by financiers of German extraction and was bitterly opposed by all American shipowners and shipbuilders. It is satisfactory to state that the New York correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, cabling on September 1st, said that the American Government had decided not to buy the German vessels, but would confine itself to purchasing neutral ships only.

Apart from this matter, the sympathies of the United States, in spite of the fact that some 30,000,000 of its inhabitants were of German extraction, were favourable to the Allies and not to the Teutonic Powers. The German case was set forth in many American newspapers with all the force of which the German Press Bureau was capable; and many well-known German professors used their influence to show that the struggle was one between culture and barbarism, the culture being represented by Germany and the barbarism by Russia. Whatever sympathy such statements as these aroused at first was speedily transferred to the other side when the American public began to hear, not merely of the German atrocities in Belgium, but of the brutal manner in which the neutrality of small and friendly countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg had been violated by the invaders. The German Ambassador at Washington, Count Bernstorff, was kept busy explaining why "strictness" was necessary in warfare; but no one took kindly to his explanation regarding the burning of Louvain, viz.: "War is not an afternoon tea-party."

By the end of August, some of the American papers began to wonder why the German Press agents in America were able to flood the Press with what they alleged to be the only trustworthy news respecting the situation at the front. It was said that this news was being sent by wireless to the German Embassy at Washington by way of the Sayville Wireless Station. An investigation at Washington disclosed the interesting fact that the Sayville Wireless Station could not possibly be in direct communication with Germany, as the distance was too great. The German Ambassador's explanation was that the messages were being relayed by German warships; but this was not credited, as it was known that very few German warships were in the Atlantic and that they were being kept continually on the move by the British and French Fleets.

Various organisations, both in Germany and in the United States, attempted to appeal to American sentiments by issuing pamphlets containing alleged facts regarding the campaign. The influence of these pamphlets, however, was a great deal more than balanced by the Chancellor's contemptuous reference to the "scrap of paper," described in the first chapter of this book.

Furthermore, it was pointed out in the American Press that Germany, so far as her social and military system was concerned, represented the antithesis of American ideals, and that a victory for Germany would inevitably lead to the imposition of her strict military system upon the world in general. Again, as a result of the falling off in imports from England, France, and Germany, the American customs receipts declined very considerably, and it was announced early in September that it would be necessary, in view of this falling off, to raise some £20,000,000 by internal taxation. The American Press promptly blamed the Kaiser for thus inconveniencing the financial arrangements of the United States, and the feeling against Germany in America became stronger than ever.

By way of climax, a striking expression of opinion came from one of the best-known American educationalists, Professor W.G. Hales. Professor Hales communicated his views to the London correspondent of the New York Times, in which paper they appeared on September 7th. He advocated an immediate declaration of war by the United States against Germany for the latter's violation of The Hague Conventions, particularly in its use of floating mines and its destruction of Louvain.

"What has always been wanted," continued Professor Hales, "is a sanction for the pacts of nations. There could be no more splendid sanction than the declaration of a great nation outside the immediate conflict that, where she is a party, they shall, so far as lies in her power, be kept sacred.

"Germany has confessed enough. Louvain has been blotted out. For the German planting of mines in the open sea alone it is our duty to declare war. The facts have changed the whole aspects of things, since President Wilson's plea for patience was made. We should ourselves guarantee the commerce of neutrals and of the allied nations, leaving the English Fleet free to do its separate work. We should, by this mere act of declaration, shut off food from Germany. We should take our part in the great struggle instead of smugly sitting by while the world's work is done by other nations. Even Germany would then know that her plot against humanity had been both judged and doomed. The insolent cry, 'Deutschland über Alles', provides no exception for the United States. At the moment of Germany's success we must transform ourselves into a nation whose first business is war. Through South America she would strike at us next.

"I have been all my life a fighter for peace, but I appeal to President Wilson, the Senate, and my private fellow-citizens, of whatever descent, to end the system of aggression and defence by arms, and to replace it with international law and international police."

CHAPTER VI

The Economic Position—Moratorium Extension—Great Britain's Oversea Trade—Germany's Commerce—Question of Food Supplies—Importance of the Balkans—"Petrograd."

In the midst of military, diplomatic, and political turmoil, the responsible departments of the Government paid very necessary attention to finance. In the course of an interesting speech in the House of Commons on August 26th, Mr. Lloyd George showed that he was looking after the financial and commercial welfare of the country. His speech ranged over a variety of subjects, and he indicated that the new £1 and 10s. notes would in time be regarded as a recognised part of the regular currency, and that they would not be entirely supplanted by the coming issue of certificates. As to the latter, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that their object was really to create credit. This might be considered, if taken literally, a somewhat dangerous statement; but the hope was generally expressed that care would be taken in granting these certificates and preventing their over issue. As this speech was of considerable importance, a quotation from the official reports is given below:

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said he did not know why there should be any scarcity of silver. It was not due to any shortage of the issue from the mint, and it looked as if there had been some hoarding, a very stupid thing. When the public got more accustomed to the 10s. and £1 notes there would be less difficulty in getting silver. With regard to the design of the new notes they would be totally different from the designs of the Scottish notes, some of which were beautiful.

They had had to consider a good many things, such, for instance, whether the notes would be easily forgeable. Then they must have a watermark which could be easily seen. For these reasons they had had to disregard the very artistic designs of the Scottish notes. It was much more difficult to imitate simplicity. Therefore, they had decided in favour of the simple note because once they had started this currency it might very well become quite popular and part of the regular currency.

With regard to the certificates the object was really that they should rather create credit without issuing the actual notes. It was purely a certificate that the banks were entitled to so much currency. They need not draw upon it, although they could, and the knowledge that they had got so much credit at the Treasury enabled them to make their arrangements for financing the trade of the country.

A question raised by Sir A. Markham with regard to the clearing of German notes touched a very difficult, dangerous, and delicate operation. The real danger was that somehow or other bills which were due for this country to Germany might be honoured. For that reason they had to take very great care that the transaction was not one-sided. He hoped to be able in the course of the next few days to set up some form of machinery that would attempt the operation, but they must take very good care that they were not financing the enemy. Certificates would only cover the case of banks; they would not cover insurance companies.

Proceeding, Mr. Lloyd George said that with regard to the general question it was certainly desirable that a statement should be made as to the arrangements entered into by the Government with regard to the finance of the country, and he hoped in the course of a few days to do so.

There were two or three very special difficulties as to which he had not, personally, been able to make up his mind. The first was with regard to the moratorium. A number of hon. gentlemen thought it ought to be brought to a speedy termination. (Cries of "No," and "Hear, hear.") He would tell the House what had been done on the subject. He had issued a questionaire to some of the leading traders of the country; he had not merely consulted bankers in the City of London. Up to three o'clock that day he had received something like 8,000 replies to the question which he had put. They were in the proportion of something like 4,500 in favour of bringing the moratorium to an end on September 4th, to 3,500 in favour of extending it.

Bankers and financing houses were almost unanimously in favour of extending it.

Retail traders were in favour of putting an end to it, but only by a majority.

Manufacturers, he should say, were two to one in favour of bringing it to an end, but the one-third represented very important interests in the manufacturing world. They were very much afraid that if it were brought to an end there might be a crash. It was therefore a thing that could not be decided altogether by a majority.

Merchants, both in the foreign and home trades, were in favour of an extension of the moratorium.

He was inclined to consider whether it was possible to get a limited moratorium, which would protect those particular interests without interfering with those who would rather have no moratorium at all. While about 10,000 forms of inquiry had been issued, that did not represent all that had been done. He had endeavoured to ascertain the opinions of bakers, butchers, and other retailers through their societies. The result was that they were hopelessly divided on the subject. The Government would have to come to a decision within the next few days.

As an instance of different points of view, he might mention that at a meeting of traders at the Treasury last week, one gentleman said that as a colliery proprietor he would like to bring the moratorium to an end, but as a merchant he would like it to continue. He agreed that the steps which had been taken with regard to the discontinuing of bills involved risks, but this was a time when they must take risks; they must keep up the credit of the country, so that they might not find at the end of the war that the important business which they had been transacting for the whole civilised world had passed away to some other country.

A good deal depended on the banks. The Government had done for the banks as much as they could have expected. But the Government did not do it in order to strengthen the banks' finances or to increase their business, but to enable them to finance the trade of the country. If the Government and the country were prepared to take risks, the banks must take risks. He agreed that a very considerable number of banks had behaved admirably. He thought that the action of other banks had been due to timidity and over-caution. They had to think about their own depositors. He did not think they were considering their shareholders or the price of their shares, but they considered themselves to be trustees of their depositors.

The time had come, however, when the banks ought to make advances with the credit of the State behind them. He had called the attention of the banks to complaints he had received, and had said that unless the traders received the usual and even greater facilities for carrying on in this special emergency, he had no doubt the House of Commons would take action which would place behind the trade of the country the necessary credit. He was glad to be able to say that the banks had come to the conclusion, after careful consideration, that they could finance business much more liberally than they were able to do during the first fortnight.

An hon. member had called attention to the fact that the foreign exchanges had broken down, and that the bridge had not been quite repaired. That was true. It had been a very sudden snap of communications. He hoped every day for improvement, but if it was necessary to take any further action in order to expedite matters, then he might have to come to the House of Commons. But he did not think it was. The discounting of bills would have the effect that the banks would find it necessary in their own interest to use the liberated cash for the purpose of financing trade.

Later, on September 8th, Mr. Lloyd George, replying to a deputation from the Association of Municipal Corporations at the Treasury, referred to the important part which finance would play in the war. In the course of his speech he said:

In my judgment the last few hundred millions may win this war. This is my opinion. The first hundred millions our enemies can stand just as well as we can; but the last they cannot, thank God; and therefore I think cash is going to count much more than we can possibly imagine at the present moment. We are only at the beginning now. Of course if we have great victories and smashing victories that is all right, but then they may not come yet. We may have fluctuations, and things may last long.

We are fighting a very tough enemy, who is very well prepared for the fight, and he will probably fight to the very end before he will accept the only conditions upon which we can possibly make peace, if we are wise.

We financed Europe in the greatest war we ever fought, and that is what won. Of course, British tenacity and British courage always come in, and they always will; but let us remember that British cash told too. When the others were absolutely exhausted we were getting our second breath, and our third and our fourth, and we shall have to spend our last before we are beaten. I want the municipalities to remember that.

Our trade is not going. The seas are ours, and they will remain ours. We shall get not merely our own trade, except that of European countries, but we shall get a good deal of the enemy's trade as well, and, of course, there is always the business which is necessary in order to keep the war going. So that there will be a great deal of employment in the ordinary course of business.

While we are on this subject of finance and economics, it may be well to refer briefly to Germany's position. It was known that Germany alone among the European Powers kept a well filled war chest. It was understood that up to 1913, the war reserve amounted to £6,000,000 in gold. Under the new Army Law of 1913, it was stipulated that this reserve should be trebled. There was reason to believe that in addition the German Government had put aside for the purposes of the present war about £30,000,000 out of the £50,000,000 which it had been hoped to raise by last year's special war levy. Although some of this cash was spent on preparing the new Army Corps, and possibly also in strengthening the fortresses, it was generally believed that the greater part of it was kept in reserve to meet the initial expenses of the present campaign.

In addition to this, of course, large sums were obtained from Belgium in the form of war levies. The Province of Brabant, for example, was mulcted to the extent of £18,000,000, Brussels to the extent of £10,000,000, Liège £2,000,000, and smaller towns in proportion. From the cities on the French border, as well as from various towns in Belgium, large supplies of stores and food were also demanded, sometimes in addition to money and sometimes as a substitute.

These amounts, large as they are, would not seem sufficient to carry on the war for any great length of time. Some calculations were made by Paris Correspondents of the Daily Telegraph at the outbreak of the campaign. The minimum cost was estimated there at £400,000,000.

The figures given by military writers coincided and agreed that about 8,500,000 men were under arms for land warfare. To these must be added 340,000 seamen. If the Balkan War were taken as an example, the cost of each man mobilised amounts to 10s. a day. This gives about £4,400,000 daily, or £132,000,000 monthly.

This figure is, however, considerably short of the mark, because it does not take into account the maintenance of the armies and fleets.

The German Reichstag authorised extraordinary expenditure to the extent of £250,000,000 to be obtained by a loan, and a further sum of £14,000,000 to be drawn on the gold and silver reserve of the Empire.

It is now well known that the tax of 5 per cent. on the stock of notes issued by the Reichsbank over and above its reserve in metal has been suppressed. The German Government will therefore secure the loan required by an issue of bank notes uncovered by a reserve of gold and silver.

This issue reminds one of the assignats of the first French Revolution, of which a few samples are kept as curious heirlooms in French families.

It was stated in Paris that the Austrian army on a war footing cost the Empire £800,000 a day, but the Austrian Treasury was emptied by the mobilisation during the Balkan wars, which drained the financial resources of the Empire for more than a year, and it is hard to see where the Austrian Monarchy can find the large sums required to keep the Imperial and Royal armies and navy during the present war.

There were many reasons that might be brought forward to show how Mr. Lloyd George was justified in asserting that England could stand the financial strain better than Germany. One great factor was responsible for this, namely, the command of the sea. It is true that during the war our trade with Germany, Russia, and France must be practically at a standstill. There are even pessimists who say that our general European trade must be severely crippled until the campaign is over. Even if we assume this to be the case, however, there is, relatively speaking, no cause for despondency. Our exports last year were valued at over £525,000,000. If most of these exports had been sent to European countries, there might possibly be some ground for concern. Of the huge total, however, the countries with which we are at war, Germany and Austria, took exports from us to the value of only £45,000,000; and our exports to every European country, including Germany and Austria, amounted to less than £180,000,000.

Expressed in other words, this means that roughly speaking, one-third of our exports went to European countries, and two-thirds to countries in other parts of the world. We have thus about two-thirds of our ordinary export trade to come and go on—thanks to our command of the sea—and, thanks to our command of the sea also, the oversea commerce of Germany and Austria has for the time being completely broken down. In view of this fact, the significance of which has hardly yet been generally appreciated, it is possible for us at the present time to capture, if not all, at least a large proportion of orders from oversea countries which in the ordinary way would be given to German or Austrian firms. It would be foolish to say, of course, that our economic life can proceed as usual during a European war in which we are involved; but it cannot be too emphatically pointed out that our economical conditions here are, or can at least be made, infinitely superior to those prevailing in the countries with which we are at war, or even in Russia or France. German commerce is ruined; our commerce can be made almost normal.

Take another point. We have a very large income from our investments abroad, which are valued at rather more than £4,000,000,000. It is estimated that our yearly income from this source is £200,000,000, and, in addition, for services rendered internationally, our bankers, brokers, shipping firms, and so on, receive an additional sum of £150,000,000. That is to say, in exchange not for goods but for services, we receive from various nations about £350,000,000 every year. True, a large proportion of this sum is derived from investments in countries affected by the war; and, on account of the war, many of these normal returns have fallen off. It must nevertheless be remembered that much of this large income comes to us from countries which are only slightly, if at all, affected by the dislocation—from India, for instance; Spain, the United States, all our own oversea dominions, and South America. Our interests in Central and South America alone are valued at £1,300,000,000.

There are other points to be remembered in connection with our position as traders. At least ten million men in France, Russia, and Germany have now been withdrawn from industry and are engaged in war. The effect of this on the remainder of the adult population and on normal production is naturally very considerable. In this country we have not as yet found it necessary to withdraw such large numbers of men from their ordinary work. Practically half a million men have joined the second army, and another half-million are asked for. The withdrawal of a million men from our industries is not likely to be seriously felt, especially as many thousands of these men will be taken from non-productive occupations. There is, therefore, no reason why we should not continue our normal export trade as well as—though of course to a smaller extent—our carrying trade.

And now for a glance at Germany's exports. In 1912 they amounted to £440,000,000, and of this figure £106,000,000 represented raw material, and no less than £295,000,000 manufactured articles. Such things as clocks, toys, musical instruments, paints, paper, glassware, iron and steel goods, gloves, hardware, and cutlery were poured into every country in the world. We ourselves took £70,000,000 worth of this stuff; India £6,000,000 worth; Australia £7,000,000; and Canada and South Africa about £3,000,000 worth each. To Argentina, in 1912, went German goods valued at nearly £13,000,000, and to the United States manufactured articles worth nearly £12,000,000. These are a few instances; the consular reports and Board of Trade statistics will furnish several others. A determined attempt must now be made to secure this trade. We shall, of course, have to compete with the United States, where for two or three years past eager attention has been paid to the possibilities of developing the South American market.

Germany, it must be remembered, did not enter upon this campaign without taking into consideration her own economic position, and especially her food supplies. Whether she was able to carry out the plans she knew she ought to carry out is another matter. The advanced state of her mobilisation at the time she declared war on Russia and France made it quite clear that her decision to put her fortunes to the test of the sword had not been taken in a day. Not even the perfect Prussian military machine could have thrown so many troops against the frontiers of France and Belgium at short notice, and it is certain that the Berlin Government, in addition to giving its attention to the organisation of the fighting forces, must have seriously considered the question of the nation's food supply. Yet the circumstantial reports which have filtered through relating to "food riots" in the capital and other large towns indicate that this important matter—perhaps because it is civil rather than military—has not had the consideration to which it is entitled.

Germany is, indeed, in an unfortunate position if her food supply is running short at this early stage of the campaign. So seldom in the history of our own country have our trade routes been blocked for even a short time that it is not easy for us to realise the situation of a country which is dependent for a large proportion of its daily bread upon foreign countries and happens to be cut off from communication with them.

The latest figures show that Germany imported agricultural products and foodstuffs in 1913 to the value of £351,836,900. These figures show but a slight deviation from those of 1912 and 1911, a deviation which changes in the population easily explain. Even when we make every allowance for wines and various luxuries which are classified under this heading, we shall be on the safe side in saying that Germany must import necessary foodstuffs every year to the value of not less than £180,000,000. This is a huge total, and it is accounted for by the fact, which has caused some concern already to German statesmen, that from an almost purely agricultural country Germany has, since the Franco-German War, developed at a remarkable rate into an industrial country. The producer has left the farm for the factory, and though one result has been a vast increase in the wealth of the German Empire, another has been to leave the Empire more and more dependent upon foreign countries for its supplies of the necessaries of life.

Germany obtains a great deal of her meat, wheat, eggs, barley, coffee, maize, butter, etc., from beyond her borders. In 1913, for example, Russia sent her grain and cereals to the extent of 3,600,000 tons, valued approximately at £30,000,000. In 1912 Argentina exported to her grain and livestock products worth nearly £11,000,000. From Hungary she received last year cereals valued at £4,000,000; and even little Roumania contributed £1,000,000 worth of wheat to the total.

The following short table, giving the import figures for 1911 and 1913, will show to what extent Germany is indebted to foreign countries for some common grain and cereal products:

| 1911. | 1913.
| (£ sterling.) | (£ sterling.)
Wheat | 19,943,750 | 21,472,850
Barley | 23,105,250 | 20,347,750
Maize | 4,336,000 | 5,309,600
Rye | 3,800,600 | 4,100,200
Oats | 3,742,800 | 3,946,300
Rice | 4,408,200 | 3,926,000
Cocoa | 2,775,300 | 2,796,000
Coffee | 12,578,450 | 12,450,500
Eggs | 8,567,900 | 4,504,800

With her coast blockaded by the British Fleet; France, Belgium, and Russia hostile; and squadrons of the Navy alert for prizes in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, it is not likely that Germany can rely upon any imports of food until the war is over. Austria-Hungary, at grips with Servia, will require for her own use all the food she can get, even if the Straits of Otranto were open. The hostility of Servia prevents any possibility of food being imported via Greece.

On this point a remarkable article, obviously inspired, and showing clearly enough why the Teutonic Powers were paying so much attention to the Balkans, appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung so far back as January 7th, 1914. The writer said:

The countries comprising the Triple Alliance are changing daily from agricultural States to industrial States; and they are more and more compelled to depend upon the uninterrupted importation of their raw materials. A war with England, France, and Russia at the same time appears, fortunately, to be ever more improbable; but the possibility of such a conflict cannot be excluded, and far-seeing statesmen must reckon with it. The Triple Alliance countries, which are compelled to have recourse to large armies, cannot hope to compete successfully with the fleets of England and France on the high seas. In the event of a struggle, therefore, our oversea imports would, in a short time, be done away with, and our industries would languish for want of raw material. As things stand to-day, it is not merely the lack of wheat and meat that would drive the country to destruction. Coal and iron and heaven knows what else have also become essential to us. Where, then, shall the Triple Alliance countries look for their raw material if the sea routes are cut off? There is only one means of land communication, and it leads through Roumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey into Asia Minor. It follows that the Triple Alliance can never see this route barricaded by hostile States; the Triplice must keep this route open at all costs.... The German military mission in Constantinople is not merely helping to reorganise the Turkish army out of pure joy; it must, at the same time, serve both Turkey and the German Empire. One should also take notice of the determination of Germany and Austria not to consent to the proposal for the inter-nationalisation of the stretch of the Orient Railway between Adrianople and Constantinople. The States lying between the eastern border of Hungary and Asia Minor have, indeed, no choice; they must be the friends and allies of the Triple Alliance; or they must reckon with the unflinching hostility of the Triple Alliance in any conflict which threatens their independence. Austria, too, has no choice. Either the countries on the Lower Danube must be her friends, or she must seek to annihilate them. It is as Napoleon said: "the Power that commands Constantinople can command the whole world, provided that it can maintain itself there." And when Bismarck said that the whole Balkan Peninsula was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, he could not have foreseen that this territory would one day become so essential a route for German imports that we should not, if necessary, shirk a conflict with Russia to maintain our freedom of trade there.

Servia, in this astonishing declaration, was not mentioned by name; but the hint to both her and Russia was sufficiently broad. Germany and Austria are cut off completely by the hostility of Servia; and, if Russia had not intervened, it is clear that this "means of land communication" would have been kept free from a "barricade," if any Power had thought of putting one up. In this connection it may be recalled that the White Paper relating to the European Crisis (Cd. 7,467) contains a significant telegram from Mr. H.D. Beaumont, of the International Financial Commission, to Sir Edward Grey:

Constantinople,
July 29th, 1914.

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonika under Greek administration, and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

The reference in the telegram was, of course, to the Bagdad concession; for Germany expected to be able to develop Asia Minor with the object of making it a country capable of furnishing the large proportion of foodstuffs and raw material which now enter Germany, from Russia, Argentina, Canada, France, and Great Britain. All the treaties and conventions relating to the concession specify this almost in so many words. Hence the desperate anxiety of Germany and Austria to secure Salonika as a port and to bring the Balkan States under Teutonic influence; since a single unfriendly nation—Servia, for instance—would have been an effective "barricade." The plan has failed and the failure has trebled the price of food in Austria and doubled it in Germany. Neither Government reckoned with a stern resistance; and the failure to do so has already led both countries well on the way to starvation.

Two instance of the bitterness with which the campaign was waged on both sides may be mentioned as a fitting conclusion to this volume. While the war was responsible for a good deal, one would hardly have expected it to affect the text of a Wagnerian music-drama. Yet the Vossische Zeitung gravely stated that "having regard to the fact that our ally, Austria-Hungary, and especially Hungary, is fighting so bravely by our side, Wagner's text to 'Lohengrin' was slightly altered at the opening performance in the Royal Opera House." In Wagner's own version Henry the Fowler sings, "Herr Gott, bewahr uns vor dem Ungarn Wut" ("Lord God, protect us from Hungaria's rage"). Knüpfer, who undertook the rôle, deleted the word "Ungarn" and substituted "Feinde" ("enemy")! The alteration is said to have been wildly applauded.

To balance this there is a Russian step to be referred to. On September 2nd the Telegraph's correspondent in the Russian capital announced that St. Petersburg was no more. An Imperial decree made it known that in future the Russian capital was to be called Petrograd. The change was in the air for some time. The German-sounding name of the city had long been a strange anomaly, and with the outbreak of war there was a widespread demand that it should be altered.

Among the Slav alternatives proposed were Petrogorod, Petrovsk, Petroff, and Sviato Petrovsk. The appellation actually selected is by no means novel in its use. There was a time when old-fashioned people pretty generally spoke of Petrograd, and not of Petersburg. The name now officially adopted for the capital is also applied to it in the works of Pushkin, Lermontoff, Alexei, Tolstoi, and Nekrasoff.

Dr. Dillon, commenting on the telegram, added:

What's in a name? The Russians hold that there is a good deal in it, else they would not have chosen the present moment to reconsider a proposal made many times during the past thirty-five years to change that of their capital on the Neva. The city heretofore known as St. Petersburg is in future to be called Petrograd. This apparent innovation is in reality a return to the old name which Peter the Great's second capital had borne from the beginning. All the old books published in that city during the latter part of Peter's reign and those of his immediate successors bear the word Petrograd on the title-pages. Grad and Gorod are two forms of the same word which means city or town. Etymologically it connotes an enclosed space, and belongs to the same root as the English word garden. It occurs in hundreds of Slav geographical names, as, for instance, in Novgorod—"new town"—Ivangorod, Elizabetgrad, Euxinograd. Constantinople itself is often called in Russian the "Emperor's city," Tsaregrad.

During the reigns of the Empresses Catherine, Anna, and Elizabeth the mania for adopting foreign names was rife in Russia, and on many places known in old Russian history German names were bestowed, most of which remain to this day.

After the Treaty of Berlin, when Count Ignatieff, who had been Russia's Ambassador in Constantinople, became at first Minister of the Interior and then President of the Slavonic Society, he, Komaroff, and a number of other Slavophiles inaugurated a movement in favour of altering those German names to their Russian equivalents, or to the original Slav appellations wherever there were any such. Before making the suggestion public Count Ignatieff asked me to draw up a list of those towns and cities, and to open a Press campaign in favour of the movement in the columns of the Press organ of the Imperial Russian Academy, the Peterburgskya Vedomosti, on the staff of which I was then a leader writer. I did so. But this attempt to Russify geographical names met with little support and encountered fierce opposition. The comic papers in particular made fun of it, and asked whether we would not include Oranienbaum—a summer residence near St. Petersburg—in our list, and call it Apelsinsk, or, say, in English "Orange-insk," and a number of other absurd translations were suggested for the benefit of the Slavophile reformers.

But the campaign was not wholly unsuccessful. The Emperor Alexander III., when he heard of it, is said to have remarked: "There is no need of going to extremes. But the cities which played a part in Russian history and had purely Russian names ought to have those names restored to them. And in this list we should include the university city of Dorpat and the city of Dunaburg. Henceforth they shall be known as Yurevo and Dvinsk." Among Russian Germans there was a great outcry at this "profanation," and most German prints and books—even those published in the Russian Empire—continued to refer to those towns as Dorpat and Dunaburg. But to-day they are known only as Yurevo and Dvinsk.

And now St. Petersburg has been added to the list.

In time, no doubt, Peterhof, Oranienbaum, Yekaterinburg, Orenburg, and a host of other places will also be rechristened, and Count Ignatieff's proposal will be fully carried out.

Wyman & Sons Ltd., Printers, London and Reading.

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